Thank you all for being here today. We appreciate it so much. As we begin on our agenda this morning is there someone who would come forward and would open our time this morning with our invocation and prayer. So someone who would do that for us today. Oh wait. Thank you. Appreciate it. And we should leave us in our pledges as well. Sure. Go ahead. Father God, we come before you today in hopes that everything that we do here will bring you glory and further your kingdom. I pray that you will give each of us an open heart and open ears to hear each other and feel each other's hearts and come together to find solutions to make this county the best that it can be. I ask you to bless each and every one of us here and help us to understand that we are all friends here. I ask you, Father God, and Jesus Holy Name to protect all of our elected officials and protect all of our officers out on the streets. And I hope that we give you glory in Jesus Holy Name, amen. Thank you. The Americans flag? I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and Jesus Holy Name, amen. Thank you. The Americans flag? A pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. On our de Texas flag, I pledge allegiance to the Texas one state, under God, one and indivisible. Thank you, and you may be seated. Let the record reflect that today all of our commissioners are present. We have a motion to approve the court agenda. We have a motion. Second, the motion. Second, all in favor. Opposed? Motion carries. At this time we're here for more citizens. Here's how we'll do this. When you come forward to speak, station first of all your name for the record, to item on either the consent or the open agenda that you would like to address. Also understanding that we have three minutes per person. One person can't speak and the other person pick up their three minutes. That's not part of the program. You have three minutes to do it. A total of 30 minutes for one particular topic. That's how what we have in our, and how we operate, just so you all know. So if there's anyone who would like to our, and how we operate just so you all know. So if there's anyone who would like to come forward and speak on a particular item, once again station names of the record, commissioner will be for the timing up. Yes. Proceed. I'm sure. Sorry. Good morning. My name is Lauren Vickers speaking on agenda item 8 and 1. I would like to make a public testimony regarding the election machines and software we currently are using and one that you wish to adopt because this is closely related. For the last three years, I've worked countless hours as a volunteer within this county. I've worked as a clerk and a judge during election day voting multiple times. I've done extensive research on how votes are cast and supposedly audited. I've recently sent not the notices to each of you via certified now regarding serious vulnerabilities within the voting system. I had the opportunity to speak to Judge Kielks, Chiefs and Staff at the Tea Party event on September 2nd. I was attempting to set up a meeting with Judge Kiel regarding my concerns and the election database the county has refused to provide our election integrity team. Despite instructions from the attorney general that requires you to comply, your Chiefs staff volunteered that the database cannot be released because it can disclose how we each vote as voters. He was very concerned with the secrecy of his own ballot at the database with examined. I express that I am also very concerned with the ballot secrecy being compromised. According to Article 6 Section 2 and 4 of the Texas Constitution, it is my right that my ballot should remain a secret, not just from the public, but more importantly from the government, And at their third party that you would contract with, I never gave you or heart in a civically authority to track how I vote. In fact, you're contract with the people expressively for a visit. When asked further how this could be seen on the database, he alluded to the fact that there's something and identifiable on the ballot that can be traced back to its voter, I asked if it was the unreadable QR code. He stated yes and alluded to the possibilities that the QR code on the individual sticker printed from the e-PROBOOK that are skilled into the voting system. Match the QR code printed on the ballot. Do these QR codes allow you or your third-party affiliates to track how I vote? What are you doing with that data? Even if your chief of staff is misreformed or misfolk, the issue remains. I cannot read a QR code. Why is that on my ballot? The system is supposed to be capable of reading optical characters. So why can't the hidden information be printed on the ballot and print the old? Why the lack of transparency? Has secure code been removed from the ballots for this upgraded system? If each of you are as concerned about your ballot as a government official being traced, why is my ballot secrecy less important than yours? I implore you to stand up in correct solutions within the current system. Please have courage in honour of your oath. Thank you. Thank you for your comments. Sir, someone else would like to come forward and speak. Yes. Good morning. Good morning. My name is Steve Lawrence. I'm speaking on behalf of several of us with agenda item 8 November 1. I have handouts that someone can please hand them out to you. As our county commissioners, it's crucial to carefully evaluate requests related to our electoral process. When considering the adoption of updating voting machines, we must prioritize the security and integrity of our elections above all else. A critical security vulnerability is one which likely leads to a complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the affected resource like an election management system. Our Manard, our Montgomery County election integrity team has identified 25 current critical security vulnerabilities, current vulnerabilities with the operating system of hard-varity 2.7. We have provided a list for you to review. One of those security vulnerabilities published just a few weeks ago has a public exploit. It allows unauthorized privilege remote access, which means that all bets are off when it comes to securing election database with that system. What is the county's mitigation strategy for the 25 critical security vulnerabilities in the heart of the VARITY 2.7 operating system? In light of these findings, will you please reject the election administrators request for approval for modified order to adopt a heart inter-savvy verity dual voting system version 2.7. Until everyone with critical security vulnerabilities has been publicly remediated. There's a problem with the heart inter-savvy machines. As the time. No, I'm not going to go over that. I'm always at something else. Proceed. Is history? I'll fill it somewhere. OK. It's historic. It goes back to 2008. I presented with the committee a little over two years ago before we actually accepted these machines. A report from five Penn State Fellows, computer science fellows, and one other six members that identified security vulnerabilities going all the way back to 2008. And it's very extensive. It was presented after the project Everest analysis was done and it reported on that. And I would like us to perhaps be a little more diligent in doing the research instead of just saying as was said last time that these machines are unhackable, absolutely unhackable. And I think we've been able to show since then that that's not the case. I'd like to consider thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Yes. Is there someone else who would like to come forward and speak on this? Yes. To a please. Good morning. Morning. My name is Kathy LaFeta. I'm seeking a bad agenda item eight and one. And we need the people of Montgomery County need your help to secure our elections. My husband and I were here when the current system was loaded for and it did pass. But we're here to talk about the revision that was made recently that is proposed. The proposed order included in this agenda item leads out a very important law. Texas Election Code 122.001 states that a voting system may not be used. In an election unless the system preserves the security of the ballot operates safely efficiently and accurately. And complies with the voting system standards adopted by Election Assistance Commission. And it is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation. Since heart varied 2.7 was certified by the Texas Secretary of State's Office, the system has gone through seven engineering change orders. None of these changes have gone through the proper certification process to validate that the changes are secure. This is a violation of the Texas Administration Code 81.61 that states that all modifications to the system must go through the examination. 81.61 also requires that the voting system be certified to the current national security standards. Although a variety 2.7 was certified by the Election Assistance Commission in June of 2022, it was certified to the 2025 voting system security standards. The EAC updated their security standards in 2015 and again in 2021, but used the old standards to certify this system. This is a violation of Texas law intended to secure our elections. These failures do not just represent a failure to follow the law, they violate our right to a pure election protected from power, to mold, or other improper practices guaranteed in Article 6, sections 2 and 4 of the Texas Constitution. We the people of Montgomery County did not grant you authority to track how we vote, or to violate the laws meant to keep our elections secure or to dilute our vote through improper practices. It is our will and demand that you vote no to adopting this new voting system. If you vote to adopt the system you agree that you are doing so with intent and full knowledge that you are violating our rights which you you soar under oath, never to do. Again, we the people who are in common county need your help to secure these elections. Thank you very much. Thank you. Are there any others? Yes. Good morning. I'm Kristen Playsons. One of the people I've seen in the Texas Constitution. I'm speaking about agenda item 8 and 1. I have been a full-time election integrity activist and election auditor bringing issues about elections to this body for over three years. During my research, I received a copy of the heart-varity administrator's guide which covers all versions of Verity. This guide contains instructions to manually record votes. In the expert report of Tom Watson found on the Secretary of State's website, he expresses concern about this feature and states that the votes are added directly to the database and also explains that the manual entries do not show up on any of the reports. Were you aware that the Verity Voting Systems have a design feature that allows the operator to manually record vote totals with no oversight? I had concerns about this so I requested a copy of the database to ensure that no manual entries have been made. The county is refusing to release the copy of the database even though the attorney general has instructed you to do so. In Article 6, Section 2 of the Texas Constitution, the people declare that free suffrage shall be protected from all due influence, from power, bribery, to moat, or other improper practice. An article 6, Section 4, the people declare that elections are to be conducted by the people. The elections are to be conducted by the people so that we can ensure that the elections represent our will and not the will of the government. These voting systems are not secure. Their accuracy has never been determined through any acceptable accounting standards. They violate the people's right to conduct our own elections by blocking us from fully auditing our elections, and they are a violation of my constitutional guaranteed right to a protected election. You are also violating my right under Article 1, Section 2, to reform government actions. In a republic, government is always to be amenable to the people. By refusing to address these issues for over three years, you are also violating my right to redress of grievances, which is not a right to make comments. It is a right to have my issues fixed when I tell you that you're violating my rights. It is my will and demand that each of you vote no to this order to adopt this new system. If you vote to adopt this system, you are publicly agreeing that you are doing so with intent and foreknowledge that you are violating my right. It's a time. Thank you. Appreciate your comments. During what else you would like to come forward and make comments. Yes. Please. Good morning. My name is Anita Henry and I'm speaking in regards to 8N1. I would like to read the vulnerabilities of the remote code, and they're telling me of them. So the Windows line printer is a program that handles the printing of documents. Hackers could possibly use it to read and update voter-related data. Number two, we have the Windows Reliable Multicast Transport Driver that helps computers share big files or lots of data quickly and efficiently over networks. Hackers could possibly use it to read an update photo of a related data. We have Windows TCP, IP remote code, is the foundation of how computers talk to each other on the internet. Hackers could possibly use it to read and update voter-related data. We have a Microsoft message curing, which is used for sending messages between applications. Hackers could possibly use it to read and update voter-related data. We also have the MSMQ used for sending messages between applications and they could use it to read and update voter-related data. We have the MSMQ sending messages between applications again for the same reason to read and update voter-related data. We have a PGM, a tool that helps computers talk to each other in groups and could possibly allow hackers to read and update voter-related data. We have a supposedly protective extensive protocol is a way to securely connect to Wi-Fi networks. A vulnerability here could expose wireless connections and could possibly allow hackers to read and update voter-related data. We have RRAS, which are the Windows Routing and Remote Access Service, is like a manager for your home or school network. It helps set up and control how devices connect to the Internet or to each other. Hackers could possibly use it to read and update voter-related data. and control how devices can met to the internet or to each other. Hackers could possibly use it to read and update voter-related data. I have 10 more. And they're all related to hackers could possibly. So I'm asking you, why would we even consider to upgrade to a hacker's can get into our network and upgrade? Thank you the time. Thank you. Appreciate it so much. Appreciate comments. Is there anybody else who would like to come forward and speak? Yes. Yes, yes, ma'am. Proceed. My name is Stephanie Chantice, and I'm talking about a genit item 8 and 1, and just a few more things about the vulnerabilities of this building machines. And we have a Internet Control Message Protocol, and that's a messenger service, it's like a messenger service for the computers. It helps them communicate basic information about their status. This vulnerability let attackers send fake messages that look like real IMCP traffic, potentially confusing computers and letting them do things that they shouldn't do. And then I think that having 25 of these potential vulnerabilities is too many for our building machines. And I hope that you take a look into it and help correct the problem and I appreciate this. Thanks. Thank you for coming forward. We appreciate it so much. Jay, one else. Yes. Sir. I'm David Berkta. Morning, David. And I want to speak on the 8-N-1 agenda item. Most of us are here on your behalf to protect you all, to guide you all in making the choice that will protect the rights of the voter in this case, the rights of the individual and their future, which is many generations. What we are expecting from our local government is the guardianship of these rights. The right to vote is one of these constitutional rights. Should not be altered or bridged or trampled or closed off to the voters' control. We do not have that with these machines. Previous to this system being purchased, many of us came and warned you that these machines were not only hackable, but they weren't going to work. When we decide that we can take our trust and put it in machines, we're in trouble. Lena Hildalgo won her two elections, but she did not get the votes to win those elections. That's Harris County's problem. That's not ours. Our problem is much easier, but we need to safeguard it in the same respect. What we have is an ability to go to where the future is leading us, which is paper ballots, something that we can audit right away, that is proof of the voters' intents and the tabulation. So what we're looking for is you all to do the job that the Constitution says, the job that the duties of your office prescribes, the respect of your rights, our rights, in a cohesive community going forward, and the ability to prove that these systems are our systems. The American voter and the American electoral process are totally diverged. They're not the same. What we have is a system that wants people to vote, but there are selections that are being done that we cannot see. I would invite each and every one of you to come down to lecture Central and let's look at these machines. And let's monitor the frequency that is activated when we turn machines on. These machines were made in China. They have modems in them. The modems are not under the board. The modems are in places that you would never expect to see. They're working, they're active. We know exactly where the servants, the signal goes to. Time is up, David. Thank you very much. Thank you so much for your comments. Appreciate it. If you want anyone else, you so much for your comments. Appreciate it. Sure, anyone else would like to come forward. Good morning, Dennis Tibbs from Magnolia. I'll also speak in briefly on ADN. I'm just confused about some things that are going on with the county. I've seen the Attorney General's letter that says the county has to release certain information about the voting machines. And I'm wondering if you guys can explain why the county government can't ignore the state government. I thought we had rules and the state will superior in that regard. So just take a minute now and explain that please. Well, I know. Yeah. Thanks. Thank you. We appreciate that. Glad to talk to you afterwards. All right. Is there anyone else who would like to come forward? All right. Thank you all very much for your comments there being done. The last move forward on our agenda As we've gone through our citizens and do we have to then the consent agenda? Do we have motion or approve consent agenda? I think we should move in one to open Let's move okay and one to open I agree with you commas. I do tell you Perfect Is there any other issues? I move there being removed. Yeah, I move with that modification. I got a motion to set it all in favor. Post motion carries. All right. In eight and one. I'm not sure if everything that's being said today is accurate or inaccurate, but I can say I believe in the most recent primary that not only did we have voting irregularities occur, but I believe that there may have been intentional manipulation, resulting in outcomes that would not match the actual votes cast, and therefore I am absolutely opposed to in one. Okay? Any other discussion? Well, you know, we spent $11, over $11 million trying to make what this county voting system is, work properly for each and every one of us in this room and this county is a total. Myself included I know that every computer can be hacked and that's honestly that's way over my head. All this things y'all talked about today I have no knowledge of any of that. But there's, and then the gentleman talking about China, and I agree with all that. But what can we do? Why don't we got how many days before election? We can't, how do we not do it? Montgomery County is one of the greatest counties in the nation. We can't not proceed. I mean, I don't understand what the answer is. I had, I heard no answers, but we don't have them either. And I'm, and obviously this is the first time I've heard about the Attorney General bringing this to our attention. So this court is a very conservative court. Y'all have to understand that. That's exactly what we do. Myself, my wife would be up here screaming like the rest of because she hates all this type of stuff. But y'all have to understand that this is a big county. And I mean, we've got 50 days or whatever it is to we can't correct this. It's, I just don't think it can be corrected. 50 days or whatever it is to we can't correct this. I just don't think it can be corrected. If somebody has an answer, if you could come forward real quick for your speak BD. I can, like to say, we all watched the 4 AM jump four years ago, we're leading it to Bob, so with that being said, I suppose as well. Judge, if you may, I just want to address the issue about the attorney generals ruling. We did receive an attorney general ruling to release the database misplacense. Before being able to release it, we were sued by hard air civic and there's been an injunction issued in Travis County which is the appropriate being you for open records requests. So there's a law pending lawsuit in Travis County between hard civic and the county and the AG. And I believe trial set for some time in January. Well, it is currently subject to injunction. That keeps us from releasing that? Yes. Because it's filed in Travis County. Now, when you have an open records dispute, either an appeal from the... If we had appealed it, we would still have to file it. But it came back since it dealt with an A.G. ruling on open record requests, the venue by statute is Travis County. So you have to file the suit in Travis County, heart to inter civic, filed in the Hearst County, served as served the A.G. There's a temporary injunction in place since the end of August that prevents us from releasing the information requested by Mr. Placehands. Suzy, what happens if we don't vote for this today? What do we do? From the mic, you would, Suzy, please. Well, what we would do is a question that would have to be answered by the commissioners court. And I don't have that answer. We have a federal deadline to send out the military and overseas ballots on Saturday or before Saturday. This comment's added. Yes. There's no other system, you know, other than manual ballots that we would have to create outside of a system that we have no ability to create. Have any, as if we look at these items, what are your thoughts on these securities or insecurities or whatever. I'm not familiar with any of those allegations. So, you know, in detail, I've heard that there was an issue in those letters, but not, I don't have personal knowledge of any of those vulnerabilities. Okay. Daniel. Can you answer any of these? Morning, commissioners, good morning, Judge. I've not read through any of this. It's not something our department typically deals with, but from listening to the comments, a lot of that was based on an insecure network. Would be what? Now I'm sorry. Sorry. A lot of these comments and the concerns for the vulnerabilities from what I was hearing. Once again, I haven't read it. I'm not an expert on voting machines. But a lot of that counts on an insecure network and saying voting is going across open internet. This is not going over open internet. It is behind a secured network, which obviously we take, you know, large measures to make sure that stays that way, and it's also encrypted information moving across. So some of those would definitely be, you know, a little negated by that, but I am not an expert in elections machines. I can't tell you 100% if any of this is true or, you know, if we have to worry about it. We were all told when we went with a system that they were they're not even hooked up to the internet is that correct? As far as I'm aware, yes, that is correct. They go through our network and it is secured and separated from the rest of the traffic on our network. You should be a lot of voting machines. The voting machines do not go through. Please speak in the microphone if you would please should. The voting machines do not go through the county network. That was the previous electronic poll book. The new ePOL book doesn't even go through the county network. And that's just for communicating voter check-in information, checking eligibility of voters. The actual voting machines only plug into electrical outlets. They don't connect to any network. How's the information kept? How is it tabulated between a time of vote is cast and each night when the poll workers leave that facility? All the votes go into what? The votes are saved. The record of each vote is saved into a memory device that's contained in the scanning devices That the ballots are scanned into and they're secured every night. How are they secured? They're secured with locks and numbered seals. Do any of them ever leave and go home with the Elections judge likes and an election judge? No. Election judge never has a reason to take that with them. Absolutely not. No. So you put a seal on it with a lock too, right? Right. They have their seal. Correct. They have their locks and they have a numbered seal and those seals are checked every morning for matching the numbers that were recorded the previous night, yes. And who has a key to those boxes? The judge has a key to the locks and that's why the seals exist. So they're tamper evident. So the judge, just one person has a key and one person responsible for making sure that that seal isn't broken, which would be the judge. Well they do it and the judge just doesn't check those seal numbers by themselves. They would have an alternate judge or a clerk. So we can write there. Watching. Correct. So they lock it up at night and the morning they get there the judge and somebody goes with them, unlocked the lock and break the seal. Right and then the report prints when it's powered on and they compare the numbers to make sure that the numbers have not changed the counts. Okay. You know the total ballot counts. You shut down that night. There's many people that voted you make sure that's the same numbers there. That's right. You open up at 7 o'clock or whatever. That's right. And we reconcile that every evening with our office, with every site. What about every machine? What about some of these folks saying that you can actually see who voted and how they voted? No. The voter privacy issue with that database is with respect to the way that the votes are recorded based on the way that precincts are split. It's a little bit difficult to describe, but every person in a precinct doesn't necessarily receive the exact same ballot because of their eligibility in each jurisdiction that might be part of that election. So in some areas that have low turnout on certain ballot styles, say if you have one or two voters and they've both voted the same way and then those are compared with other records that have already been released by law showing who voted in those precincts. Then those pieces of information could be put together to see how a person voted. It's not a direct record of an individual voter in their vote selections that's in that database. It's pieces of information that would be put together. So the requirement that we move to this modified ward here to adopt the new voting system, are we required to do that? Are we operating in terms of the old system? It's not a requirement. Some of the benefits of the new system are layout of the ballot and the avoiding having to go to either like a legal size sheet of ballot paper or two sheets of later size ballot paper for voters to have to use when they vote depending on the length of the ballot. To check the accurately, a voting of the votes that are cast, do you ever compare that to the actual paper ballots? Do you do a count of the paper ballots every time? We do a manual count after every election, right? That should address some concern. After every election or after every day? No, during the voting period, we don't know results anymore than anyone, you know, until correct. The manual count is after the election is completed. There, we, given the amount of money that we have previously spent in the time that we spent research and going through the whole process. And now we come up where we have a new system, a new voting system, where there's identified these vulnerabilities. I've got to say, I would be in favor of going with the old program as opposed to moving to the new one. Are those claims you make to the new upgrade? I can't tell you. I don't know. I can go by what I hear here and these are our citizens talking to us and I think at least At this point and I know we're out of time and so since we are out of time And there's this much question to leave it where it is right now and then to move forward and check this stuff out And because we don't have time to do it right now to just shut this whole deal down. Because I'd like to know about this, but how are we going to get this done? How do we move to, if we were ever going to go to paper ballots, how, or, you know, paper manual? How many of you have done that? How are we going about doing that within the time frame, especially for military types, people who are overseas? I mean, we just don't have a time to do it, but we have used the previous program that we believe at the time, and I still believe was fairly accurate. I don't know about the vulnerabilities, like that's being explained here, but I can tell you that there is this underlying current that I think these needs, these need to be resolved before we move forward on the new system. I would have to... Is there a claim that any of these didn't exist prior to version 2.7? It would probably take us about three weeks to prepare to use 2.5. Is that what we used last last the last election? Yes. So you've been preparing to use this. Why did you wait until now to add forward to be approved then? If it was something that you wanted to use knowing that there are all these questions out there, why would you just now bring it forward? Because you seem to have put us in a really bad situation. That wasn't my intention obviously, but the intentional or not were here. The complaints about the voting system have existed long before version 2.7. So you can't go back to the old system very easily. So does the old system have some of these same claims? The claims that were presented were originally about 2.5. That's what this one meant. So back to 2.5 is really not going to. It's still there's a chance that things could be hacked or checked. It's my understanding that the complaint is generally about using voting systems for market ballots, counting ballots. So what you're saying is if we stay with the old system now, the old program, that there are deadlines that are going to be missed for people getting... Oh, we won't miss the deadlines. We'll just have to do it manually. Do what manually? How much are it manually? We would have to issue the military and overseas ballots manually and then duplicate those that were returned to comply with the whatever system that we use if it wasn't 2.7. Okay, the question is can you use 2.5? Can you use what we used in what may? Is that may? We can, not today. Well, we don't have to worry about voting today. However, as we move forward though, this has come up before. It can come up again. Here we are again talking about additional issues. In my judgment, if there's any way we can stay with 2.5, I would have to go with not passing this today. Joe, I would ask for evidence that these are additional issues with 2.7. I don't believe that they are. What's the gap between the versions, Susan? There was a 2.6 that... Is there a security upgrade? I mean, what's the difference? I'm not familiar. I don't want to misspeak on that topic. I believe it had to do with connections between the different components of the system. And so for one of her from you, the biggest inconvenience that your office would have would be getting the mail into the overseas balances that I understand that correctly. No, the biggest inconvenience would be reverting to the prior system, reprogramming the machines, retesting, who been preparing. Because we haven't even approved this. So the approval is for the use in the election. There's been quite a bit of work done on that conversion already. Prior to approval. Prior to approval of its use, yes. Gotcha. So two of the other big items that we heard were the QR codes. It's the QR code something that can be removed from... No, and it doesn't include any voter information. I could gather the information that is in the QR code and present it to the court at another meeting. Are there any other counties using the same system you're thinking about using? Yes. So it's kind of a case. I'm sorry, Judge. There's Harris County upgraded to this system. I don't know. I'll say if that. Susie, during. Well, you said I was looking. There's some information. And it was mentioned that during the last election. When we were setting up for voting on the actual primary day. I guess there had been a convention or training or something on the Monday before the election. You familiar with what I'm talking about? No, we just issued equipment the day before. And that the judges released from what I understand the South County election judge had taken that box home Monday night and brought it Tuesday to the election place. That is standard operating procedures for every no. A few minutes ago that they don't take boxes home. After they've been used. So sometimes they don't. No, after they've been used, they don't. Prior. Don't know what's happening to this box when it's sitting and In an election judge is home. You have no idea when they arrive. I should never go home with them Why do they go? In every precinct and every county that uses a voting system What is in the election you talk that they can sabotage? I mean is there anything in there that they can sabotage? I mean, is there anything in there that they can sabotage? What's for the vote? Not tomorrow. Yes, but they want the votes to put in that. They don't take those home, correct? Correct. How do you know they don't put votes in them at home? They bring back all the money. They bring back more. They confirm that we put seals on the machines. We locked them before they go out. Those numbers are confirmed by the judge and another poll worker, an alternate judge, whatever the case is. I'll do this for you to create, you said something about creating paper ballots, doing that for this election. And no, we currently don't have a system for that. Probably not outside. I assume version 2.7 can do that issue a paper ballot in that it would be. Now there ones that go out in the mail are hand marked but they're not hand counted. The same election judge to have the key that takes the box home. Maybe you know what does the 10 person doesn't have a key to get in the box might be a good idea has the county elections committee commission reviewed this what is their position that's it's not the role of the election commission you described the commissions wrong to a point or terminate the elections administrator there was a rumor about the AG's office potentially having an investigation regarding Montgomery County elections. Do you have any information regarding that? I have not heard anything about that. Okay, we have a lot of discussion. I'm going to make a motion. The motion is that we stay with the current system that we have. That in that we do the evaluation of this for next round. It's too late to go into anything else right now as far as paper ballots and whatnot. But we can manually send this stuff. So I would move that we, that we, I would vote against this and that we would not be in favor of moving forward on it. Do I have a second? Second. There are motion seconds, very more discussion. All in favor? Hi. So this means we're opposing this? Yes. Yes. We all, we everybody opposes it. So as soon as you know, that's going to be a little bit of a heartburn for you in terms of getting stuff out. We appreciate all that you do for us. We appreciate the citizens who have come in and shared this with us. And it's worthy of continued discussion and study. Thank you. Appreciate it so much. All right. At this time, we're going to move into our open agenda, purchasing. Gilbert, can you come forward please? Do we approve? Do we approve this? No. No. We voted no. And see the agenda? Do we approve it? We can. We approve the implementation. The official did. Yeah. Thank you. You're? Yes, sir. Good morning. Our first item is a change over to our current pace set of temporary services contract. Second, all in favor? Opposed? You're going to motion carries. The motion will prove item B. And the second is to, for permission to negotiate with the highest qualified respondent for a financing opportunity with Wood Forest or a second. I have a motion in a second. On this floor for multi-purpose community centers. Right. Right. Got it. Yes, sir. I have a motion in a second. Any more discussion? All in favor? Aye. Opposed? Motion carries. Thank you. All right. Thank you. All right. Thank you. This time we're going to recess when government carries commissioners court to convene a public hearing. Precinct three. Consider an approved posting commercial vehicle parking prohibited anytime signs on both sides of common spin drive between harmony, common spin drive, and discovery creek Boulevard on both sides of harmony. Commons drive between commons, uh, spin drive and state highway 99 on both sides of Harmony. Commons drive between Commons, Ben drive and State Highway 99 on both sides of Harmony Market Drive between Harmony Commons Drive and Discovery Creek Boulevard. Anyone here to discuss? Got just the new one. All right, let's go ahead and reach and gene court and we have a motion to approve item A1. We have a motion to our second. We have a motion to the second. We have a motion to second. All in favor? Pose. Motion carries. All right. At this time we're going to go to executive session. I'm pursuant to one more of the following provisions of the Texas government code to which chapter 551 subjebter dean articles 551.071 and 551.072. Be patient. We shall be back in a few moments. All right. Thank you. We're going to reconvene court. All right. There is no action to be taken in executive session. So is there a motion to adjourn? We have a motion adjourned second. All in favor? Opposed? Motion carries. Thank you all very much.