CITY OF OAK HILL  CITY CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE CITY COMMISSION CHAMBERS - CITY HALL  OF OAK  234 South US1 Oak Hill, FL 32759 (386)345-3522  ELORIDE  March 6, 2024 3:00 PM Minutes  A: OPENING 1.Call to Order 2. Pledge of Allegiance 3. Roll Call  Richard Taylor, Chair called the meeting to order.  Present: Richard Taylor, Dru Ann Welch, Carrie Werning, Derwin Smothers, Darry Cummings, Not Present: Cydney Reagan (Notified City Administrator that she would not be present).  Charlie Dean, Tom Pentz, and Ron Engele.  B: PRESENTATIONS) BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENTS  Motion: Charlie Dean motioned to approve minutes from last meeting.  2nd by: Tom Pentz Action: Approved  C. COMMITTEE DISCUSSION out to resources to help find it.  Dru Ann' Welch asked ifwe have located Appendix A.  Erin Anderson, Administrative Assistant stated that she has not located the Appendix buti is reaching Jerome Adams, City Administrator handed out at few forms, one from Ken Parker and onei from Dru Dru Ann Welch volunteers at the museum and while ati the museum she found an old Metes and  Ann Welch.  Bounds boundary description from 1977. Ms. Anderson made a copy.  1. Discuss Charter sections. Article 4.01  The committee discussed forl against the Commissioners elected by districts or At-Large. Charlie Dean requests that Mr. Adams find out what it would cost to create districts. Dru Ann' Welch makes a motion for the City Admin to contact someone regarding what the cost Sections A, B, and C were tabled until. Jerome Adams, City Administrator/Staffresearched cost.  would be to be a city at large or districts. Carrie Werning seconded.  Consensus to move on to the next section 4.02. Unanimous.    Charter Review Committee discussed if the mayor should be able to have the authority as a representative of the city to attend meetings in Tallahassee or other government events. Orwould the commission have to vote on a representative to go on behalf oft the city. The committee asked ift they could draft up new verbiage to reflect what change they would like to make toi the Charter Section 4.02. Derwin Smothers was asked to write the Section with  new wording.  Consensus to move on to next section. Unanimous.  4.03 Vice Mayor. 4.04 Compensation  The City Charter Review Committee reviewed the section and found no issues.  City Charter Review Committee thinks this section is ok. Tom Pentz mentioned that the commission does not get paid enough. should get reimbursed for their milage for travel outside city limits.  Vice Mayor Lindlau sent a recommendation toi the Committee and suggested Commissioners Charter Review Committee discussed that ift the Commissioners are out ofi the City Limits, then yes, they should be reimbursed for milage if they are using their personal vehicle. Charlie Dean said that the City has a city car, and if the commissioner uses the city vehicle  then the commissioner would not need reimbursement.  4.05 Vacancies  City Charter Review Committee has reviewed and agreed that no changes need to be made. City Charter Review Committee discussed what constitutes excused or unexcused absences. Darry Cummings motioned to remove "Consecutive unexcused absences" and replace it with  4.06 Forfeiture of office  "per term".  Dru Ann Welch seconded. 4.07 Filling Vacancies  Motion passed Unanimously, move to next section.  This section was reviewed, and they all agreed that it should remain the same.  Consensus to move ont to next section. Unanimous  4.08 Meetings  Committee agrees that the verbiage ini this section should remain the same.  4.09 Quorum/Noting  Committee agrees that this section is good. Handouts: Description of Hybrid Voting-/ Ken Parker    2. Set Agenda for next meeting Revisit 4.01 A, B, and C Reviewing 5  D.CONSENT AGENDA 1. Minutes February 21, 2024 2nd by: Tom Pentz Action: Approved  Motion: Charlie Dean motioned to approve minutes  Note: In accordance with Resolution 2006-17, ai three (3) minute time limitation per speaker will be imposed. A speaker may address the Commission for ar maximum of three (3) minutes during the Public Participation portion of the meeting, andi for a maximum oft three (3) minutes during any specific Agenda topic. Pursuant to Florida Statute 166.041 (3)( (A),if an individual decides to appeal any decision made with respect to any matter considered at a meeting or hearing, that individual will need ar record oft thep proceedings andy willr need to ensure thata a verbatim record oft the proceedings isi made.  ATTEST: fh  Adane Adams, City Administrator  ER    Hybrid District/At Large Voting  The City of Oak Hill shall consist of5 5 members, a Mayor and 4 City Commissioners. The Mayor shall be elected at large. The City shall be divided into four commission districts to ensure local representation. At the time of filing, the candidate must reside in the district. Ifelected, the Commission Member must continue to reside in the district throughout the term of office. Ifan elected Commissioner moves out of the district they represent, the seat shall be deemed vacant and must be filled by the City Commission as provided for int the City Charter. However, voting will be conducted city wide, allowing all residents to  participate in the election of Commission Members.  Single Member Districts  The City of Oak Hill shall consist of 51 members, al Mayor and 4 City Commissioners. Thel Mayor shall be elected at large. The City shall be divided into four commission districts to ensure local representation. At the time off filing, candidates must reside in the district. Ifelected, the Commission Member must continue to reside in the district throughout the term of office. Ifan elected Commissioner moves out of the district they represent, the seat shall be deemed vacant andi must bei filled by the City Commission as provided fori in the City Charter. Only electors residing within each Commission district shall be allowed  tov vote for candidates representing the district in which they reside.  Establishment of Commission Districts and Adjustments of districts. (a) Number of districts. There shall be four (4) city commission districts pending subsequent (b) District commission. By the first day of the month following official certification oft the decennial census to the state, the city commission shall appoint ten city electors determined from the registration fort thel last statewide general election, who shall comprise the districting commission. Electors chosen shall not be employed by the city in any other capacity. The districting commission shall be empowered to divide the city into districts for the election of commission members and redefine thel boundaries thereof, as it deems necessary bya majority vote of those present and voting. After the division of the city into districts, one, but not more than two, commission members shall reside in and qualify from each district, but shall be elected from the city atl large. The districting commission will be an ongoing commission whose duties and terms of office willl be spelled out in ane enacting ordinance. (c). Report; specifications. Within 120 days of the appointment, the districting commission shall file with the official designated by the city commission, a report containing a recommended plan for adjustment oft the commission district boundaries to comply with these  changes by the districting commission established in (b).  specifications:    (1) Each district shall be formed of compact contiguous territory, and its boundary (2) The districts shall be based upon the principle ofe equal and effective representation: as required by the United States constitution and as represented in the mathematical preciseness reached in the legislative apportionment of the state; (3) The report shall include a map and description of the districts recommended and shall be drafted as a proposed ordinance. Once filed with the designated official the report shall be treated as an ordinance introduced by a commission member; (d) Support. It shall be the responsibility of the city administrator to provide staff  lines shall follow the centerlines of streets;  assistance and technical data to the districting commission;  (e) Procedure. The procedure for the commission's consideration of the report shall be the same as for other ordinances, provided that if a summary oft the ordinance is published pursuant toi this charter and general law, it must include both the map and a description of (f) Failure to enact ordinance. The commission shall adopt a redistricting ordinance at least 90 days before the next regular city election. If the commission fails to do sO by such date, the report of the districting commission shall go into effect and have the effect of an (g)Effect ofe enactment. The new commission districts and boundaries, as oft the date of enactment, shall supersede previous commission districts and boundaries for all the purposes of the next regular commission election, including qualifications. The new districts and boundaries shall supersede previous districts and boundaries for all other purposes as of the date on which all commission members elected, subsequent toi the date the new districts An Alternative Method for Establishment of Commission Districts is for the City  the recommended districts;  ordinance;  went into effect, take office.  Commission to assume that responsibility.    TheA American Review ofPublic Administration Volume 381 Number I March 2008 24-40 02008 Sagel Publications 10.1.7/027597400730438 http: llarp.sagepub.com hostedat http: llonline.s sagepub.com  City Manager and City Administrator Role Similarities  and Differences Perceptions Among Persons Who Have Served as Both David N. Ammons  University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  The hiring of chief administrative officers, also known as city administrators, in municipalities with the mayor-<:ouncil form of government has contributed to the professionalization of these city governments. Although some observers suggest that the role of city administrator is the functional equivalent of city manager, survey responses from 276 persons who have held both Keywords: city manager; administrator; reform; roles; forms oflocal government; CAO The position of city manager was introduced a century ago to bring greater efficiency and professionalism to cities adopting the council-manager form of government. In time, cities operating under the older mayor-council form began to hire chief adminis- trative officers (CAOs), often called city administrators, in hopes of bringing similar benefits to their governments. This article examines the proposition that a city administrator who serves in a mayor-council form of government is the functional equivalent of a city manager Some commentaries on role similarities and differences of city administrators and city managers have focused conceptually or normatively on how these positions should work and should: relate to other officials in their respective systems, whereas others have drawn upon thej perceptions of persons with direct insights on only one form of government or the other. This article draws on perceptions that are likely to be broader and more balanced in aj par- ticular way. Here, the proposition ofrole equivplency is explored through the perceptions of persons who have held both positions at vario times in their career and therefore possess special insights on the similarities and differences they have experienced personally. Unlike persons whose preference for one of thet twoj positions is sO: strong that they rule out serving in the other position without even trying it, these persons have at some time perceived promise and opportunity in both. How do these persons compare the two sets of roles, Author'sNote: Igratefully acknowledge graduate research assistants Adam) Ross, Sara Yanosy, and Matt Bosse for their help with this study. Correspondence should be addressed tol David N. Ammons, CB# 3330 Knapp: Sanders Building, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3330; e-mail:  jobs note similarities and important differences.  inac council-manager government.  responsibilities, and expectations?  ammons@sogunc.du. 24    Ammons ICM and CA Similarities and Differences 25  Background: Reform Movement  A century ago, Progressive Era reformers sought to rid American cities of rampant waste and corruption in municipal affairs. They promoted merit civil service to remove the influ- ence of politics from hiring decisions and encouraged purchasing reform to reduce its impact on contract awards. Most cities eventually adopted these reforms. The reformers also pressed for fundamental changes in the way city councils were elected and city governments were structured and managed. They took particular aim at two features of the electoral system thought to be most crucial for sustaining the political machines of the early 20th century: the focus on party affiliations of candidates for municipal office and the election of city coun- cilors by ward. They urged the removal of partisan labels from municipal ballots and the elec- tion of council members on an at-large basis. Reformers argued that city council members should be elected not as partisan politicians representing a single ward or district but instead as nonpartisan, civic-minded citizens focusing on the needs of the entire community. The reformers also recommended a basic structural change in the organization of city government. They proposed that the mayor and city council retain ultimate responsibility for the city government but appoint a city manager to serve them as chief executive. The city manager would be a skilled, professional manager, selected on the basis of education and experience, and would serve at the pleasure of the city council. The administrative appara- tus of the city in this council-manager form of government would be under the direction of the appointed, professional manager rather than an elected mayor. By 1915, the National Municipal League, forerunner to today's National Civic League, was recommending the council-manager form in its Model City Charter and many cities were adopting it as their The reformers' electoral and structural proposals were embraced in some communities, adopted partially and only gradually in others, and fiercely resisted in still other cities. Changes, however, continued across the 20th century. Over time, some ofthe early adopters oft the electoral and structural prescriptions rescinded or modified various oft these reform elements, whereas many of the resisters relented and adopted selected elements of reform. The history of reform adoption, partial adoption, and modification has produced a broad The percentage of U.S. cities that operate on a council-manager platform with an appointed city manager serving as chief executive (53% among cities having aj population of 5,000 or greater, according to survey responses) exceeds the percentage operating on a mayor-council base with the mayor serving as chief executive (39%; International City/County Management Association, 2006, p. xii). Observers have noted in recent decades a blurring of the sharp distinctions that once differentiated reformed" from "unre- formed" cities (Adrian, 1988; Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004). Some council-manager cities have adopted partisan ballots, many have adopted district election of councilors or systems that include a mixture of district and at-large characteristics, and many have switched to popular election of the mayor and have granted expanded authority to that office.2 Various departures from the prescriptions of the original council-manager plan, labeled "the reform of the reform" (Hansell, 1998, 1999), have left relatively few cities with what might be called the "pure" council-manager form. Whether inspired by the desire to  municipal structure.  mosaic of systems in evidence today.    26 The American Review of Public. Administration  boost political responsiveness, to increase the representativeness: of the city council, or to enhance political leadership where it was perceived to be lacking, collectively these changes have made the "more professional" form of government (i.e., council-manager government) Changes in cities operating under the mayor-council form of government, where poli- tics are prominent and the mayor serves as chief executive, have taken these cities in the opposite direction. They, too, have adopted civil service and purchasing reforms. Furthermore, many mayor-council cities have authorized their chief executive mayor or city council to appoint a CAO to bring professional expertise to the administration of municipal operations. The introduction of the CAO-carrying an array of official titles in various cities, including city administrator, chief of staff, executive assistant, and deputy mayor, as well as chief administrative officer-and the changes that the CAO often brings tocity government have made the "more political" form of government (i.e., mayor-council government). more professional (Adrian, 1988; Frederickson et al., 2004). Many proponents of mayor-council government suggest that the introduction of the CAO or city administrator (the titles will be used interchangeably) gives this form of government the advantages of professionalism normally associated with council-manager government and the strong political leadership of mayor-council government-in short, the best of both worlds. They suggest that thel hiring of CAOS is the equivalent of bringing the city manager tor mayor-council government and point to the fact that many CAOs are, in fact, former city managers. Some scholars have reinforced this point, declaring, for instance, "lt turns out that CAOs in cities with mayor-council statutory platforms are much like city managers in cities with council-manager platforms" (Frederickson et al., 2004, p. 133). Or declaring, "a sizable proportion of previously mayor-council cities have adopted city-manager-like' positions" Form-of-goverment scholar James Svara is al keen observer oft the roles and relationships oflocal government officials. Svara(1999) notes that "city administrators have limited per- sonnel appointment authority and are slightly less likely than city managers to have other executive powers" (p.3 32) and that city administrators arej perceived by council members to be influential in policy processes but less influential than city managers (Svara, 2003). Furthermore, city administrators serving chief executive mayors occupy a secondary posi- tion in the executive chain of command, whereas city managers serve as "the head of the administrative organization-not the assistant to the head" (Svara, 2004, p. 21). Serving in asecondary capacity rather than as chiefexecutive can still be very influential, but second- rung status on the executive ladder inevitably handicaps an administrator's ability to shape the culture and operating standards of the organization. Nevertheless, Svara (1999) notes that city administrators "have extensive executive authority" and concludes that "city managers and city administrators are more alike than we. have often presumed" (p. 32). Increasingly, scholars are comfortable lumping CAOs and city managers together in their research and describing the responsibilities of "chief appointed officials," as if their roles were functionally equivalent (e.g., MacManus & Bullock, 2003; Svara, 1999). Some propo- nents of council-manager government disagree, insisting that the roles, and therefore the professional influence, of city managers and CAOs are far from equal.4  more political.  (Meek, Schildt, & Witt, 2002, p. 146).    Ammons /CM and CAS Similarities and Differences 27  City Administrator Role  San Francisco hired a CAO for its mayor-council government in 1931. Other major mayor-council cities, including Philadelphia, New Orleans, and New York City, soon fol- lowed suit. It is important to note that the city administrator in this system typically reports tot the mayor rather than to the council, although in many cities the council does have a role in the hiring and termination of the city administrator. Detractors suggest that this arrange- ment, particularly where the hiring is unfettered by council influence, opens an opportunity for the mayor to deviate from the original intent and appoint aj political supporter rather than a professional manager. James Hogan (1976), an early chronicler of the CAO plan, observed, "The role of the CAO can vary all the way from errand boy to competent administrator The gap! between the roles oferrand boy and key administrator is wide. Placement along this divide is determined not only by the experience and skills oft the person selected as city administrator but also by the willingness of the mayor, and sometimes the city council, to trust the CAO's judgment and to vest real authority in the position. The mayor in mayor- council cities is chief executive, whether a city administrator is appointed or not. The magnitude oft the mayor's executive authority, however, varies across mayor-council cities, depending on the responsibilities declared in the city charter. When executive authority is concentrated in the office of mayor, it is said to be a strong mayor form; when executive In some mayor-council cities, the CAO either formally or informally has been granted considerable administrative authority, but even a strong city administrator typically channels budget recommendations through the mayor rather than directly to the city council and seeks the mayor's approval prior to important hiring decisions-for, as previously noted, the mayor isc chiefexecutive in the mayor-council form. Budget ideas that fail to meet the approval oft the mayor are likely never to be seen by the council. The CAO's choices for department head appointment similarly may be preempted. In contrast, city managers in council-manager governments have the opportunity toj present unfiltered budgetary recommendations: tot the city council and, ini most cases, to make personnel decisions.5 Although city managers and city administrators both exercise important roles in similar arrays of functions, the fact that the mayor ini mayor-council governments is chiefexecutive is likely to curb any actual budgetary and personnel management authority that might be granted formally to the city administrator, rendering this official weaker than the city manager in these and other key executive functions. Still, the notion that the CAO is, or can be, the functional equivalent of the city manager is strongly held in some quarters. Ini fact, thel Los Angeles CAO once was named by ai national publication as the nation's all-pro "city manager" (Oakley, 1987). Ini their recent study of forms oflocal government, Frederickson et al. (2004) document thei tendency of mayor-council and council-manager governments each to adopt characteristics of the other. Focusing on mayor-council governments, they declare, "When a CAO is appointed exclusively by the mayor, we regard that city as an adapted political jurisdiction. Most of these CAOs function very much like city managers" (p. 163). But eveni ift they are engaged in the same functions, can we be certain that the two positions are: functionally equivalent? If we detect key differ- ences ini influence and discretion in some of the most important of these functions, would this  performing functions similar to those of city manager" (p. 81).  authority is diffused, iti is said to be a weak mayor form.  limit our ability to assert functional equivalency?    28 The American Review ofF Public Administration  Survey of Persons Experienced as Both City Manager and City Administrator  Scholars, practitioners, and local government observers have offered their views on the roles of city managers and CAOs; the relative strengths, weaknesses, and similarities of the two positions; and their relative contributions to the professionalization of local government. Some of these assessments are conceptual, offering perspectives based on system design, for- mal grants of authority, and notions of how a given system should work ideally. Others draw on the experience and perceptions of local government officials in one form of government or another. Still others contrast the experiences or observations of those familiar with one system to those familiar with the other. A perspective largely missing from this discussion is Perhaps no one has greater insights into the similarities and differences in the roles and responsibilities of city managers and city administrators than persons who have served in both capacities. A review ofinformation: available in Municipal Year Books and membership directories oft thel International City/County Management Association in 2004 produced the names of 448 individuals who had held both positions at some time during their careers in local government. The cities served by these persons ranged inj population from less than 1,000 to more than 850,000 people. Contact information could be secured for alll but 10of these persons, yielding a set of 438 potential respondents to a survey on the differences between the roles and responsibilities of city manager and city administrator. The survey was conducted in 2004-the first wave by e-mail and the second wave by standard mail-and Respondents drew upon their experience as city manager and city administrator to outline the characteristics and demands of each role. They shared their views about similarities and differences in the two roles and also in the respective forms of government in which these positions are found. This study probes dimensions of professionalism, staff stability, political influence, administrative responsibility and discretion, human resource management and budgetary influence, role complexity, and status. In some cases, there was broad agreement among respondents on similarities or differences; in other cases, broad disagreement.  that held by persons whol have experienced both systems.  netted 276 usable responses, for an effective response rate of 63%.  Findings  Each survey respondent had held both positions during his or her career: city manager in council-manager government and city administrator in mayor-council government. On the surface, at least, these respondents corroborated some of the contentions regarding role sim- ilarity. The respondents agreed that both are demanding positions. Although some reported that their typical workweek when they served as city manager was 401 hours, others reported ar normal workweek as lengthy as 80 hours. The reported range of normal workweeks during their service as city administrator ran from a low of 40 to al high of 75 hours. The respective means for all respondents were 53.7 hours of work in the city manager's typical week and 52.6 in the city administrator's. Both positions are important and demanding. Ifthe work hours ofcity managers and city administrators differ little, what about the manner in which occupants of the two positions divide their time among management, policy, and    Ammons CM: and CA Similarities andl Differences 29  Table: 1  Mean Percentage ofTime Devoted tot the Management, Policy, and Political Roles by Persons Serving as City Manager (CM) and City Administrator (CA)  %ofTime Devoted to Specified Roles  Persons Whol Have Served in Both Roles  Ammons andl Newell Study'  CM 1985 50.8 32.2 17.0 142  CA 1985 55.3 27.0 17.6 100  CM 2004 53.2b 29.0b 17.9 275  CA 2004 53.8 26.9 19.0 275  Management role Policy role Political role n Population of cities a.A Ammons and Newell (1989, p. 62).  50,000 and greater  850,000 and fewer  b.A Although the mean percentages for city managers and city administrators. appear remarkably similar across a period of two decades, two differences are statistically significant. ttests reveal statistically significant differences int the percentage of time reportedly devoted by city managers to the management role across the two studies, 1274)-2.57,p=.01,: and tot the policy role, 273)--462.px.001. Among city administrator time allocations, the only difference that could be considered significant is the time reportedly devoted to the political role across the twos studies, t(274)= 1.98, p= .049, but only ifone accepts a much more, generous significance threshold. political roles? To what extent are some roles emphasized in one position and deemphasized in the other? The respondents in the current study were: more numerous and represented cities having a wider population range than those in a 1985 study of time allocations (Ammons & Newell, 1989), but the reported time allotted to the management role, defined as administra- tive activities; to the policy role, including council relations; and to the political role, includ- ing community leadership, were strikingly similar across positions over two decades of time--even if, for aj pair of dimensions among city managers, these small differences in time  allocation achieve statistical significance (Table 1).  Role Equivalency?  If persons who have served in both positions report that the posts of city manager and city administrator demand similar hours and that incumbents allocate similar amounts of their time to various roles, does this add up to role equivalency? Not necessarily, according to the Respondents were asked to declare their agreement or disagreement with a series of state- ments, some asserting that particular characteristics were more associated with one position or form of government and others declaring that the positions and forms of government are comparable on a given characteristic. The responses, shown in Table 2, are reported for the set of respondents as a whole and by subsets according to the current or most recent position (city manager or city administrator) held by the respondent.6 Respondents also were asked about the relative influence and authority associated with the respective positions. In each instance, they were allowed to indicate neutrality on a given statement or question.  respondents.    30 The American! Review of Public Administration  Table 2  Agreement and Disagreement With Statements Regarding City Managers (CM) and City Administrators (CA)  Percentage of Respondents Who  Respondent  Strongly  Strongly 4.7 4.2 5.6 0 0 0 12.0 11.2 13.3 17.5 14.3 22.4 2.5 2.4 2.8 5.1 4.8 5.6 4.0 1.8 7.6 5.9 6.6 4.7 10.2 10.1 10.4  Statement  Category n Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Current CA 107 27.1 38.3 12.1 16.8 Current CM 169 71.6 28.4 0 Current CA 107 80.4 19.6 0 Current CM 169 5.9 24.3 15.4 43.2 Current CA 105 8.6 23.8 17.1 37.1 Current CM 168 6.0 14.3 20.8 44.6 Current CA 107 2.8 15.0 10.3 49.5 Current CM 168 24.4 55.4 3.0 14.9 Current CA 107 29.9 50.5 2.8 14.0  L.Mayor--<ouncil govemments Total than council-manager governments (X2=1.772, p=.7776) 2.1 Both CAs and CMs must Total be politically astute 3.1 Longevity of CAs tends Total tob be more dependent on political skills and connections than that of CMs (K-1.604,P=.8081) 4.CMs tend to focus on city Total council concerns and relations more than CAs do(x=8.53,p= .073) 5.CAs and CMs devote similar amounts of attention to city council concerns and relations <X=1124,P= 8905) 6. Staffs tend to be equally Total manager and mayor- council governments <X=8.985,P=. .0615) 7.1 Municipal staff tends to ber more professional in council-manager governments (X2= 14.166",p-.0068) 8.Staffs tend to be equally and mayor--<ouncil governments (X2= 5.008,p=.2865) 9. Municipal staff tends to Total council governments <X=506,P=2809) *Statistically significant at p:5.01.  275 24.0 42.5 11.6 17.1  tend tob ber more politicized Current CM 168 22.0 45.2 11.3 17.3  276 75.0 25.0 0 274 6.9 24.1 16.1 40.9  0 0 0  275 4.7 14.5 16.7 46.5 275 26.5 53.5 2.9 14.5  Total  274 7.7 37.6 12.4 37.2  professional in council- Current CM 167 4.2 36.5 13.8 40.7  Current CA 107 13.1 39.3 10.3 31.8 Current CM 167 18.6 43.7 15.6 20.4 Current CA 105 10.5 33.3 15.2 33.3  Total  272 15.4 39.7 15.4 25.4  Total  273 5.5 43.6 10.3 34.8  stable in council-manager Current CM 167 4.2 40.1 10.2 38.9  Current CA 106 7.5 49.1 10.4 28.3  274 0.7  5.1 17.2 66.8 5.4 14.9 69.6 4.7 20.8 62.3  be more stable in mayor- Current CM 168 0.0  Current CA 106 1.9    Ammons ICM and CA Similarities and Differences 31  Role equivalence would be corroborated convincingly if clear majorities of respondents consistently agreed with statements asserting role similarities, consistently rejected statements asserting role differences, and consistently offered: neutral responses to questions asking which of the two positions has greater influence or responsibility. This level of corroboration was achieved occasionally on questions pertaining to general qualities, such as political astuteness and focus of attention, but only rarely on matters of influence and responsibility. More com- mon were either clear majorities associating ag given characteristic with one position or form of government or the other or split verdicts among the respondents-substantal numbers associ- ating one of the two positions or forms of government with a given quality, substantial numbers naming the other position or form on the same question, and still others unable to Itist tempting to regard a split decision--one that for a given question draws large numbers of responses for the city manager and roughly similar numbers for the CAO-as corrobora- tion of role equivalence; of course, iti is not. In such instances only a minority of respondents has declared that there is no difference in roles. The majority in such cases has rejected role equivalence, even if the respondents could not agree among themselves about which of the two positions is more associated with a given quality. Split decisions are testimony to wide variation within each form of government on the particular qualities highlighted by a given question. On some questions and qualities, however, there was a clearer verdict, suggesting A few respondents did indeed offer opinions asserting role equivalence and declaring that they perceived few meaningful differences in forms of government. Comments supporting Differences in positions are negligible. The differing needs of differing cities served are what make the differences. Trying to find real differences between managers and administrators is like Success ine either form has more to do with fit and management stylet than the form of government. Seldom, however, were such opinions expressed sO overtly. More often, respondents who thought form-ol-govemment differences are overstated said that mayor-council and council- manager labels only hint at likely differences. A label, they argued, does not guarantee these differences. The authority implied by a given label may yield to contravening forces in the form of ordinances, traditions, and the personalities, predilections, education, and job experi- ence oft the mayor and members of city council or the perceived skills and integrity oft the per-  draw distinctions.  less variation on that quality within a given form ofg government.  this view included the following:  splitting hairs.  son serving as manager or administrator. Wrote one: respondent,  Experience and answers [to questions about role characteristics) depend on [the] people for whom [one is] working. Different election results in either type of community would have Even among the group ofr respondents who argued that the significance ofl labels is over- stated, some offered comments implying that they held the precepts of council-manager government in higher regard. These respondents noted that the city administrator can be  changed my answers for my experience.    32 The American Review of Public Administration  elevated by ordinance or tradition to arole equivalent to city manager or a city manager can Thel key, in my mind, ist thea ability oft thes governing body to let you manage. What Ii found as acity administrator ist thati ifI acted more asacity manager the governing body was happy tol have me act that way.. : In [my] current city manager position, the governing body [is accustomed] tot think(ing] policy and [is] not [inclined] tor micro-manage.Your can getal lot done when you don't A respondent who cautioned against assuming too much from a job title or form-of- govemment) label recommended instead a careful review of charter provisions and relevant ordinances to learn the actual roles and responsibilities ofa a position. He noted that a char- ter provision requiring council ratification of decisions tol hire or fire department heads has Thet times spent on political concerns is greater ini mayor-council cities because oft time dealing with amayor who wantst tol bet the CEO [chief executive officer] buto does noth have thek knowledge, skills, ora ability tol bec one. Ibelievet thaty weak city administrators or CAOsi in mayor-council cities become glorified clerksi in a caretaker role and therefore are not change agents that can act strategically. The city council has ultimate authority in council-manager government, but the city manager is appointed as chief executive. Action taken by the mayor or a member oft the coun- cilt that would usurp the manager's executive authority is considered encroachment and is likely to be resisted, perhaps even by fellow council members. In mayor-counci governments, the role of city administrator is defined not as chief executive-the mayor holds that title-but as head of administration. The involvement of the mayor (and, in weak mayor systems, perhaps even the members of the city council) in administrative functions is less likely to be regarded as encroachment, thereby weakening the hand of the professional administrator for coordina- tion and control. Only if the elected officials-typically the mayor but in some cases the city council-trust the city administrator to manage city operations and function as an executive, can the city enjoy the benefits of professionalism touted by advocates of the mayor-council- Bottom line is that the difference between the two forms varies dramatically with the trust level of the current city council. If the trust level is high, both forms operate almost the same. If the trust level is low, the city administrator form has greater potential for bad government. As a whole, the respondents perceived differences in the work environments and authority of city managers and city administrators. For instance, they declared mayor-council government to be more political than council-manager government by a 2-to-1 margin (66%a agreed or strongly agreed, whereas the other one third of respondents disagreed, strongly disagreed, or were neutral; see Statement 1 in Table 2). This does not imply, however, that council-manager governments are devoid of politics. All respondents-100% of them- agreed that both roles demand political astuteness. Nor does it mean that the worst images of political influence ini mayor-council cities are confirmed. Most respondents rejected the stereotype oft the mayor's appointed CAO as a crony or political operative. A statement suggesting that thel longevity of city administrators is particularly dependent on political skills  be reduced similarly to the role of city administrator.  have to watch your back.  the effect oft turning a city manager into a city administrator.  govemment-with-CAOcombination.    Ammons /CM and CAS Similarities and] Differences 33  and connections met disagreement more often than agreement. The respondents perceived clear differences in the two forms of government on the political continuum, but the forms In mayor-council governments of the strong mayor variety, the separation of powers between the executive (mayor) and legislative (council) branches is apt to bes sharp. In the absence of a supervisor-subordinate relationship between the city council and mayor- appointed city administrator int that form ofg government, one: might assume that the bulk of the city administrator's attention would be directed toward the initiatives and concerns of the mayor and municipal staff and that less attention would be directed toward the city council. This relationship would be different in mayor-council governments where the city council shares executive authority and has ar role in the appointment of the city administrator. And certainly, the relationship would differ from that of a city manager, who is appointed by and accountable to the city council in a system without separation of powers. The respondents, however, challenged the assumption that city administrators might be less focused on the city council than city managers. Although precise testing ofa anticipated dis- tinctions was not possible in the absence of details about the structures of mayor-council cities int the backgrounds of the respondents, iti is reasonable to assume: a mixture of strong mayor and weak mayor structures among the set, with portions oft the respondents having experience in each system. Nevertheless, four ofe every five respondents contended that city administrators and city managers devote similar amounts of attention to city council concerns Analyzing perceived differences inj professionalism and staff stability by coupling pairs of questions together reveals that a majority of respondents tended either to regard these characteristics as equivalent across forms of government or to give a decided edge to council- manager governments. On the matter of professionalism, 45% agreed with the statement that staffs tend tol be equally professional across forms of government (Statement 6i in Table 2), whereas 55% gave the edge to council-manager governments (Statement 7). Persons who had served as city administrator earlier int their career but now were serving as city manager were especially likely to regard council-manager staffs as more professional (X2= 14.166, p<.01). City administrators were more evenly divided on the matter. A plausible explana- tion for this finding can be built on an assumption that greater variation exists int the degree of professionalism among mayor-council governments. City administrators finding them- selves in governments at the more professionalized end oft the mayor-council government spectrum are pleased and stay, but many recall favorably their experience in professionalized council-manager governments as well. City administrators landing in governments at the less professionalized end of the spectrum are: not pleased and depart for a council-manager government, where they report finding a higher level of professionalism. Parsing responses to the questions regarding staff stability (Statements 8 and 9) reveals almost half perceiving equal stability across the two forms of government and only 6% reporting a stability advantage for mayor-council governments. That leaves an apparent 45% who perceive greater staff stability in council-manager governments. The opportunity to assemble and retain a staff on the basis of professional skills and experience, unencumbered by political pressures in the appointment process, and then to direct that staff is prized by professional managers. If they are to be held accountable for the performance of the organization, they argue, they should be allowed to hire the most  were not placed at polar extremes.  and relations.    34 The American Review of Public Administration  Table3  Percentage ofRespondents Associating Selected Characteristics With the Position of City Manager (CM) or City. Administrator (CA)  Respondent Category Total Current CM Current CA Total Current CM Current CA Total Current CM Current CA  Neither/About Equal/Difficult toSay 15.6 11.8 21.7 52.4 44.0 65.4 23.7 14.9 37.7  n 275 169 106 275 168 107 274 168 106  CM 81.1 84.6 75.5 46.5 54.8 33.6 74.8 84.5 59.4  CA 3.3 3.6 2.8 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.5 0.6 2.8  Whot tends tol have more authority to assemble and direct his or her management team? CX'-4325,P=.089) Whot tends tol have more influence on budgetary matters?(x2= 12.004*, p=.0025) Which position tends to carry the greater level of responsibiliy?(x= 22.003**,p-. .000017)  Statistically significant atps .01. **Statistically significant atps .001.  competent staff they can and given the authority to direct its efforts. Overwhelmingly, the respondents agreed that city managers have this authority to a greater degree than city Proponents of the council-manager form assert that important differences may be found in the authority of the city manager and CAOi in matters of human resource management, as well as differences in the influence of politics on hiring decisions. Some respondents reported My experience in a large mayor-council city was that the staff was much more likely to be friends and supporters of thei mayor. This also was my experience all through the organization because those that! hired thel lower level staffa also tended tol hiret their friends and acquaintances As a city manager, staff hirings were based on [who was] best qualified and met education and experience requirements. Way too many times as a city administrator the mayor and council would waive important requirements of education and experience for senior positions in order to hire a' "good old boy." As a result the citizens pay thej price and get a quarter on the dollar. The biggest difference is that the city manager has control of department heads and staff and therefore more control of the direction oft thet town and the quality ofstaffwork. The respondents as a whole asserted that city managers have equal or greater budgetary influence than city administrators and possess a greater level of overall responsibility. Half of the respondents, unable to attribute greater budgetary influence to one position or the other,  administrators (Table 3).  experiences corroborating these assertions.  even when a civil service system was inj place.    Ammons ICM and CA Similarities and Differences 35  Table 35  Which Position Is Considered More Complex? More Political?  %1 Responding City (CA) 30.5 29.8 31.8 44.2 44.3 43.9  Respondent Category Total Current CM Total Current CM  City Manager Administrator n (CM) 275 21.8 168 23.8 107 18.7 274 15.7 167 16.8 107 14.0  Neither/About Equal/Difficult to Say 47.6 46.4 49.5 40.1 38.9 42.1  Which role is more complex/difficult? (X=1.004,p- .6054) Current CA Which role tends to be more political? -0476,p-.7884) Current CA  presumably would argue that budgetary influence is roughly equal. However, among the other half of the respondents-those who could attribute greater influence to one position or the other-almost all associated greater budgetary influence with city managers. Little support at all was found for the notion that city administrators have greater budgetary influence. These perceptions were expressed more distinctly than might have been anticipated in light of recent research showing city managers to assess their influence in budgetary matters only moderately greater than city administrators assess theirs (92 VS. 87 on a 100-point scale; Svara, 1999). This set of respondents, consisting of persons who had served in both roles, On the question of overall responsibility, respondents were also in broad agreement. More than four fifths of the respondents currently serving as city manager, and more than half of those serving as city administrator associated greater overall responsibility with the role of The privilege of presenting thej proposed budget directly to the city council isi important to city managers for symbolic, professional, and practical reasons.. As chief executive in council- manager government, iti is appropriate that the city manager present unfiltered, professional recommendations to the municipality's board of directors. Furthermore, because it is al key policy document, the budget represents one of the city manager's principal vehicles for offering policy recommendations. Managers are understandably protective of this preroga- tive. Assertions regarding greater overall responsibility of city managers were particularly pronounced among respondents currently serving as city managers (X2=22.003, p <.001). Especially noteworthy, however, is the fact that even those respondents currently serving as city administrators were more likely to concede equal or greater budgetary influence and greater overall responsibility to city managers than to claim them for CAOs. Greater budgetary and personnel authority does not necessarily mean that the city man- ager's role is more complex than that oft the CAO. One respondent declared bluntly, "The role of city administrator is much broader than that of city manager, and much more complex." This view was shared by almost one third of the respondents, perhaps in recognition of the more political environment that the city administrator must navigate (Table 4). Still, almost half could not distinguish one position from the other in terms of complexity.  drew sharper distinctions.  city manager.    36 The American Review of] Public Administration  Which role is more political? Nearly three times as many respondents said city admin- istrator was the more political position than made such an assertion about the city manager, but 40% were unable to designate one position as more political than the other. Several respondents noted issues of authority that can distinguish the two forms of government from each other and that caused them toi favor the role of city manager inc council- Administrators do not have much authority. Their decisions are frequently changed by the polit- ical process and politicians. Administrators are often little more than puppets of elected officials and more often than not have nos skills in government, administration, supervision, or leadership. Under the council-manager system the lines of responsibility and accountability are usually more clearly outlined. Under the city administrator form the management responsibility can ber nebulous and lead to conflict over "who's the boss." This can create al lot ofs stress among council members As city administrator I have often been hamstrung by the mayor's ego and desire to take care of department heads who tell her what she wants to hear. Iti is therefore extremely difficult to man- age those department heads who still look to the mayor as their ultimate authority. The council has, as ai result, recently changed the charter toj provide the administrator with more authority. As acity manager in a city that hada al long history of city managers, the department heads were much City managers seem to experience much less office politics. Employees must deal with the manager instead of [holding] the implied threat oft the "end run" to the mayor or council. As city administrator, [I was] appointed by the mayor and approved by the council. [Ini that system] the department heads would play off of the administrator and mayor-that is, [they would] go to whichever they thought would approve of their request. The city administrator had continuous conflicts with the mayor over what constituted day-to-day operations, which were normally the responsibility of the city administrator. On the other hand, the city admin- istrator hadt the political cover of ther mayor's office, whichi isi not: available tot the city manager. The remarks of respondents suggest that many perceive differences in appointment, bud- getary, and general management authority between city managers and city administrators in general and wide variation among city administrators. Some CAOs are granted considerable authority, and some are not. The comments of respondents suggest that as CAOs, they are pleased when they are granted the authority normally associated with city managers. As city  manager government:  and staff.  easier to manage. They [understood] they were part of my team.  managers, they expect such authority. Career Progression  Respondents held differing views regarding the status and desirability of the city manager position relative to the position of city administrator. These differences were particularly evident when respondents were asked about career progression and, more specifically, about what constitutes a lateral move or a step up professionally. A careful review of their answers suggests that the group as a whole tended to accord equal or greater status and desirability to    Ammons /CM: and CA Similarities and Differences 37  Table: 5  Municipal Officials' Assessment of Career Progressions  %of Respondents Who  Respondent Category  Strongly  Strongly 2.9 3.0 2.8 6.2 3.0 11.2  Statement  n Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree 274 5.8 35.4 19.0 36.9 106 6.6 44.3 19.8 26.4 276 4.7 37.7 22.8 28.6  A move from a CA position toa Total CM position in a city of similar size and characteristics Current CA isal lateral move protessionally CX2=9.260, P=. .0549) A move from a CA position toa Total CM position in aslightly smaller city having similar characteristics isa a stepz up professionally (X2: = 19.005**,p=. .0008) Note: CA = city administrator; CM = city manager. **Statistically significant atp .001.  Current CM 168 5.4 29.8 18.5 43.5  Current CM 169 5.3 46.2 19.5 26.0 Current CA 107 3.7 24.3 28.0 32.7  the position of city manager (Table 5). When asked if a move from the city administrator position in one city to the city manager position in another city ofs similar size and character- istics would be considered a lateral move, respondents were divided. Approximately 41% thought that it would indeed be a lateral move, 40% disagreed, and 19% could not say. Why did SO many disagree? Did they perceive such a move to be a step up rather than merely a lateral move? Responses toai related question suggest that the answeri is yes. Status among managers and administrators is drawn in part from the size of the commu- nity one serves. This factor was removed from the equation by the previous question that posed ai move to a community ofs similar size. Thej population factor, however, was used in the next question to test the extent to which the role of city manager might actually be favored, for in this question the destination city is smaller. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "A move from a city administrator position toa city manager position in a slightly smaller city having similar characteristics is a step up professionally. ." More than 42% agreed or strongly agreed, even though the move would be toas smaller city. The level of agreement was particularly evident among current city man- agers (51.5%), each of whom had also served as city administrator in thej past (X2=19.005,  p<.001). Wrote one respondent,  Iwent from a much larger community as a city administrator to a smaller one with a long tradition of professional council-manager government. After 17 years, I have noi regrets!  Another was even more adamant:  Iwould never work as a city administrator again.    38 The. American Review ofPublic Administration  Conclusion  Scholars and urban observers have declared that distinctions between the mayor-council and council-manager forms of government are becoming blurred and that the two forms are moving closer together in many respects (Adrian, 1988; Frederickson et al., 2004). They, of course, are correct. However, occasional assertions that CAOs in mayor-council cities have brought to their municipalities the same level of professionalism that city managers have brought tot theirs are overstated. Too often these assertions disregard impor- tant differences in serving in the role of chief executive (city manager) versus the role of principal assistant (CAO), as well as differences in thej political-professional environments that persist despite general movement toward the blurring of the forms of government. Differences in politicization and professionalism in council-manager and mayor-council governments, manifested in differing budgetary and personnel influence andi in the respon- sibility vested in appointed professionals in the respective forms of government, are reported by professionals who have held top appointive posts in both. Despite the blurring Thej perspectives of persons surveyed in this study contribute to al broader understanding of role similarities and differences. Having served as both city manager and city administra- tor at different points in their careers, their observations are firsthand. Still, it is important to recognize the limitations, as well as the strengths, of this set ofr respondents as experts on the question of role equivalency. The principal limitation is that the perspective of each respon- dent is limited by the particular conditions he or she has experienced. The perceptions reflected in their responses have been influenced by the individual communities the respon- dents have served, the personalities and practices oft the mayors and councils with whom they have worked, and the prescriptions and restrictions of state laws and city charters affecting local government structures in the communities along their particular career paths. Their views regarding the level of responsibility and influence they held as city manager and city administrator are likely to be affected by the sequence, career stage, and length of tenure in the positions they held, as well as by relationships and occurrences they observed or experi- enced and now consider to be characteristic ofa a given form of government. Nevertheless, the set of respondents in this study is a large group of persons that is not restricted to one state or region, one career sequence (i.e., a manager-to-CAO progression or vice versa), or service with mayors and council members of one personality type. Included in the set of respondents ial broad range of experiences, providing ample opportunity for favorable and unfavorable recollections coast to coast, community type to community type, and mayoral personality to The research design for this study perhaps is biased somewhat to the advantage of city administrators, making the results in favor of city managers all the more striking. Ift the lit- erature suggesting that CAOs range from competent administrator to errand boys is correct, this set ofrespondents, consisting solely of persons who also have served as city managers, undoubtedly underrepresents the errand boy element. Iti is unlikely that persons whose pro- fessional credentials qualify them for city manager positions would accept or even be offered an errand boy role.'Ifthis assumption is correct, this study could understate the dif- ference between city manager and city administrator roles in general by underrepresenting that portion ofCAO positions with minimal influence and managerial responsibility.  of distinctions in the broadest sense, these key differences remain.  mayoral personality.    Ammons /CM: and CA Similarities and Differences 39  Despite these limitations, this set of respondents lends tot the question of city manager-CAO role equivalence thej perspective of practitioners who have experienced both roles. Theirsisn not the detached perspective of arm's-length observers. Nor is theirs the perspective of a practi- tioner who has served in only one of the two positions and is convinced of the superiority of that position andi its form of government. Theirsi ist thej perspective of persons whol have labored Asag group, persons who have served in both roles acknowledge thei functional similari- ties oft the positions ofcity manager and city administrator. But on several key dimensions- particularly on matters of budget and human resource management-they reject the assertion ofr role equivalence. On these important dimensions, the city manager's influence and authority are perceived to be greater. These findings suggest that local government observers and modern architects of municipal organizations overreach when they imply that CAOs and city managers are alike in their influence on the professionalization of a city's government. Professionalism tends to be advanced by the appointment of a city administrator  toi function effectively in each position.  and advanced even: further by the appointment ofac city manager.  Notes  1.The figures reported are based on survey responses from 5,142 cities of 5,000 population or greater. Other forms of city government include the commission form (2%), the town meeting form (5%), and the representative town meeting form (1%). The two major forms of local government are the mayor-<:ouncil and council-manager forms. In the mayor-<:ouncil form, the mayor serves as chief executive. Executive authority may be concentrated in the office of mayor ("strong mayor" form) or diffused among the mayor, city council, and elected executives ("weak mayor" form). In many cases, the mayori in mayor-<:ouncil governments (especially in the' strong mayor" variety) has the power to veto council actions. The election of council members is often by wards and partisan. As noted in this article, the introduction of the council-manager form of govemment was the reformers' attempt to professionalize local government and preserve the ultimate authority of the city council but reduce the influence 2.E Early versions of the council-manager plan typically called for the selection of the mayor from among the persons elected to city council. Often this was accomplished by a simple vote of the new council. There were and are, however, many variations. For instance, some rotate the office of mayor among council members; some others award the office of mayor to the highest vote getter in the general election. Increasingly, however, even council-manager cities haver moved toward popular election of the mayor, as notedi in this article. 3.1 Representativeness proved to be a problem in many reformed cities, where at-large voting systems thwarted the efforts of minority candidates to gain election to the city council. Candidates who could carry the election in their minority neighborhood failed to do so on a citywide basis. By switching to district elections, 4.Among the most ardent advocates oft the council-manager: form of government and the role of city man- ager is a group of International City/County Management Association members calling itself the "Staunton 5.A Although city managers. have the authority to prepare the proposed budget and tol hire and fire department heads, many acknowledge that often they confer with the mayor and council prior to exercising this authority, especially before filling key staff positions or removing a major department head.. As noted by one respondent tot thes survey reported in this article, "Such approval is not required in a council-manager: form, but aj politically astute city manager will bes sure his/her appointments meet the approval oft the council in any event." 6. The "current position" variable is isolated for examination not only because the position itself could reflect the perceptions and preferences among respondents, given that they have accepted their current position after prior servicei int the otherf form of government orp perhaps in both forms, buta also because it could have more subtle influences on their responses. Itsi influence could be positive, for respondents might be tempted to ratio- nalize their career progression and put aj positive spin on their current position and form of government, orit  ofpolitics ona administration and service delivery.  many oft these cities achieved greater representativeness: ont their city councils. Society" after the Virginia city credited with hiring the first city manager in 1908.    40 TheA American Review ofPublic Administration  could ber negative ift thep pressures oft their current position, whichever itis, cause them tor recall fondly thel best features oft the other form of government (a' 'greener grass" syndrome). Responses from persons not currently serving as either city manager or city administrator were included with the position most recently occupied.  7.Iam grateful to an anonymous reviewer for offering this observation.  References  Adrian, C.R. (1988). Forms of city government in American history. In Municipal Year Book 1988 (pp. 3-11). Ammons, D. N., & Newell, C. (1989). City executives. Albany: State University of New York Press. Frederickson, H.G., Johnson, G.A., & Wood, C.H. (2004). The adapted city: Institutional dynamics and struc- Hansell, W.H H., Jr. (1998). Isi it time to' "reform" the reform? Public. Management, 80(12), 15-16. Hansell, W. H., Jr. (1999). Reforming the reform, part 2. Public Management, 81(1),28. Hogan, J.B.(1976). The chief administrative officer: And alternative toc council-manager government. Tucson: International City/County Management Association. (2006). In Municipal year book: 2006. Washington, DC: MacManus, S. A., & Bullock, C. S., III. (2003). Thei form, structure, and composition of America's municipalities int the new millennium. In Municipal) year book. 2003 (pp. 3-18). Washington, DC: International City/County Meek, J. W., Schildt, K., & Witt, M. (2002). Local government administration in a metropolitan context. InH. G. Frederickson &. J. Nalbandian (Eds.), Thej future oflocal government administration (pp. 145-153). Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association. Oakley, A. (1987).4 A commanding view from the top. City and State, 4, 18. Svara,J J.H.(1999). U.S. city managers and administrators ina a global perspective. Inl Municipal, yeark book 1999 (pp. 25-33). Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association. Svara, J.H. (2003). Two decades of continuity and change in America's city councils. Washington, DC: National Svara, J.H. (2004). Achieving effective community leadership. In C. Newell (Ed.), The effective local govern- ment manager (3rd ed., pp. 21-56). Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association. David N. Ammons ist the. Albert Coates Professor of Public. Administration and Government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of Municipal Benchmarks:. Assessing Local Performance and Establishing Community Standards (Sage, 2001) and Tools for Decision Making: A Practical Guide for Local Government (CQ Press, 2002). His research interests include local government management, performance  Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.  tural change. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.  University of Arizona, Institute ofGovernment Research.  Author.  Management. Association.  League of Cities.  measurement, and benchmarking.