CITY OF OAK HILL  CITY CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE CITY COMMISSION CHAMBERS - CITY HALL  234 South US1 Oak Hill, FL 32759 (386)345-3522  FLORIDP  March 27, 2024 3:00 PM Minutes_  A: OPENING 1. Call to Order 2. Pledge of Allegiance 3. Roll Call B: CONSENT AGENDA Minutes March 6, 2024  Richard Taylor called the meeting to order.  Tom Pentz stated that the March 6th minutes need to be corrected. Minutes should say that the Commissioners would be reimbursed for their mileage outside city limits.  Motion: Tom Pentz moves approval as amended.  Seconded by Dru Ann. Vote: Unanimous Minutes March 13, 2024 Motion: Tom Pentz move to approve. Seconded by: Carrie Werning Vote: Unanimous.  CPRESENTATONS/BRE: ANNOUNCEMENTS 1. Jerome Adams, City Administrator, District Discussion  Mr. Adams read a letter from Kurt Spitzer discussing the cost of switching to single-member districts. Thanks fory your inquiry and that of the Charter Review Committee. The largest costi in switching to single-member districts would bei the cost of creating the district boundaries using census data and appropriate geographic information system (GIS) software. This can ber roughly dividedi into two parts: The cost of acquiring the data and    loading iti intoi the GIS software; andi the cost of building consensus among the City's elected leadership (and the Ifthe development of the districts is something that can ber relatively easily accomplished, the cost of the project could be around $12,000. Ifi its more complex andi time-consuming, the project's cost could be more like $20,000. This would need tol be repeated every 10y years - after the release of the decennial census data. Butonce adopted, the cost of updating the districts should be minimal unless there in significant growth within or Having worked with numerous charter review committees and over 35 redistricting projects in Florida (see www.KSAnet.net), my opinion ist that the question of at-large verses single-member districts is far more important to thet future of the City than the cost ofs switching districting systems. Ifthere are sound reasons to go to a single- member system (or some other system of electing members of the council) the City should do sO. Ifthere are not good reasons, the City should not consider the policy change. But whether to consider the change should not be  communtyleadershp, as to whati the initial boundaries should be.  annexations into the city.  based ont the cost of creating districts.  Thope this helps and am happy to talki further with you ort the Charter Review Committee.  Best, Kurt Spitzer  KURT SPITZER and ASSOCIATES D: COMMITTEE DISCUSION 1. Discuss Charter Section 4.01 and 4.02 Discussion about Districts. Tom Pentz seconds. Mr. Taylor called for a vote. Tie Vote 4 in favor and 4 against. Vote Failed.  Charlie Dean Motioned that the committee brings districting to the Commission.  2. Review Charter Section 6  Committee asked Jerome to clarify why he would like the title of City Manager.  Mr. Adams said that having the title of City Administrator he must explain to others what his job is. Mr. Adams also explained that being a City Manager could potentially open more doors. Committee discusses the difference between City Administrator and City Manager.  Derwin Smothers makes a motion to bring Scott Simpson in to discuss Job description defining Committee decided that they will make a list of their questions, and have Scott Simpson Derwin Smothers withdraws his motion and Ron Engele withdraws his second.  City Manager VS. City Administrator. Ron Engele seconds.  answer them at one of the City Charter Meetings.    6.01- Discussion of 4/5, 3/5 or majority rules. Mr. Taylor asked the committee if they agree with 4/5. 50 ofthe 8 members raised their hands.  Section 6.02-  Darry Cummings discussed removal of the words to be done in the sixth line. Committee discussed this request and Darry Cummings made a motion.  Motion: Darry Cummings Seconded by Dru Ann Welch  Action: all agreed to remove the verbiage to be done.  The Committee discussed the sentence "Whereas the City Commission and any of the commissioners cannot direct the city employees". Commissioners can direct the City  Administrator but not the City staff.  Committee has reviewed A-E and no changes.  Dru Ann Welch discussed the verbiage from (F). Ms. Welch motioned that that the City Administrator/ City Manager make a complete budget finance report for the Commission and  the public on a quarterly basis instead of at the end of each fiscal year.  Seconded by Tom Pentz. Action: 7 Yes; 1 No  Committee also reviewed H-N. No changes.  O-D Derwin Smothers made a motion to have (0) remove from 6.02.  Seconded by Dru Ann Welch Action: Approved by all Section 6.03- No changes  Darry Cummings informed the committee that he would not be in attendance next week.  3. Set Agenda for next meeting. Complete 6.04 Appendix A (1994)  Review Changes made during City Charter Review Committee meetings.    Note: In accordance with Resolution 2006-17, ai three (3) minute time limitation per speaker will be imposed. A speaker may address the Commission for a maximum of three (3) minutes during the Public Participation portion oft the meeting, and for a maximum of three (3) minutes during any specific Agenda topic. Pursuant to Florida Statute 166.041 (3)(A), if an individual decides to appeal any decision made with respect to any matter considered at a meeting or hearing, that individual will need a record oft the proceedings and will need to ensure thata a verbatim record oft the proceedings is made.  ATTEST: fe  Hame Adams City Administrator  Chair  6R    Hybrid District/At Large Voting  The City of Oak Hills shall consist of5 5 members, a Mayor and 4 City Commissioners. The Mayor shall be elected at large. The City shall be divided into four commission districts to ensure local representation. At the time of filing, the candidate must reside in the district. Ifelected, the Commission Member must continue to reside in the district throughout the term of office. If an elected Commissioner moves out of the district they represent, the seat shall be deemed vacant and must bet filled by the City Commission as provided fori in the City Charter. However, voting will be conducted city wide, allowing all residents to  participate in the election of Commission Members.  Single Member Districts  The City of Oak Hill shall consist of5 5 members, al Mayor and 4 City Commissioners. The Mayor shall be elected at large. The City shall be divided into four commission districts to ensure local representation. At thet time of filing, candidates must reside in the district. Ifelected, the Commission Member must continue to reside in the district throughout the term of office. Ifan elected Commissioner moves out of the district they represent, the seat shall be deemed vacant and must bet filled by the City Commission as provided fori int the City Charter. Only electors residing within each Commission district shall be allowed  to vote for candidates representing the district in which they reside.  Establishment of Commission Districts and Adjustments of districts. (a) Number of districts. There shall be four (4) city commission districts pending subsequent (b) District commission. By the first day oft the month following official certification oft the decennial census toi the state, the city commission shall appoint ten city electors determined from the registration for the last statewide general election, who shall comprise the districting commission. Electors chosen shall not be employed byt the city in any other capacity. The districting commission shall be empowered to divide the city into districts for the election of commission members and redefine the boundaries thereof, as it deems necessary bya majority vote of those present and voting. After the division oft the city into districts, one, but not more than two, commission members shall reside in and qualify from each district, but shall be elected from the city at large. The districting commission willl be an ongoing commission whose duties and terms of office willl be spelled out in ane enacting ordinance. (c) Report; specifications. Within 120 days of the appointment, the districting commission shall file with the official designated by the city commission, a report containing a recommended plan for adjustment of the commission district boundaries to comply with these  changes by the districting commission established in (b).  specifications:    (1) Each district shall bei formed of compact contiguous territory, and its boundary (2) The districts shall be based upon the principle ofe equal and effective representation as required by the United States constitution and as represented int the mathematical preciseness reached int the legislative apportionment oft the state; (3) The report shall include a map and description of the districts recommended and shall be drafted as a proposed ordinance. Once filed with the designated official the report shall be treated as an ordinance introduced by a commission member; (d) Support. It shall be the responsibility oft the city administrator to provide staff  lines shall follow the centerlines of streets;  assistance and technical data tot the districting commission;  (e) Procedure. The procedure for the commission's consideration of the report shall be the same as for other ordinances, provided that if a summary of the ordinance is published pursuant tot this charter and general law, it must include both the map and a description of () Failure to enact ordinance. The commission shall adopt a redistricting ordinance atl least 90 days before the next regular city election. Ift the commission fails to do so by such date, the report oft the districting commission shall go into effect and have the effect of an (g)Effect of enactment. The new commission districts and boundaries, as of the date of enactment, shall supersede previous commission districts and boundaries for all the purposes oft the next regular commission election, including qualifications. The new districts and boundaries shall supersede previous districts and boundaries for all other purposes as of the date on which all commission members elected, subsequent tot the date the new districts An Alternative Method for Establishment of Commission Districts is for the City  the recommended districts;  ordinance;  went into effect, take office.  Commission to assume that responsibility.    The American Review ofPublic Administration Volume 381 Number I March2 2008 24-40 02008 Sage Publications 011770230740072938) htp.lampsagepub.com hostedat http:!lonlines sagepub.com  City Manager and City Administrator Role Similarities  and Differences Perceptions Among Persons Who Have Served as Both David N. Ammons  University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  The hiring of chief administrative officers, also known as city administrators, in municipalities with the mayor-<:ouncil form of government has contributed to the professionalization of these city governments. Although some observers suggest that the role of city administrator is the functional equivalent of city manager, survey responses from 276 persons who have held both Keywords: city manager; administrator; reform; roles; forms oflocal government; CAO he position of city manager was introduced a century ago to bring greater efficiency and professionalism to cities adopting the council-manager form of government. In time, cities operating under the older mayor-council form began to hire chief adminis- trative officers (CAOs), often called city administrators, in hopes of bringing similar benefits tot their governments. This article examines the proposition that a city administrator who serves in a mayor-council form of government is the functional equivalent of a city manager Some commentaries on role similarities and differences of city administrators and city managers have focused conceptually or normatively on how these positions should work and should relate to other officials in their respective systems, whereas others have drawn upon thej perceptions of persons with direct insights on only one: form of government or the other. This article draws on perceptions that are likely to be broader and more balanced in aj par- ticular way. Here, thej proposition ofrole equivplency is explored through thej perceptions of persons who have held both positions at vario times in their career and therefore possess special insights on thes similarities and differences they have experienced personally. Unlike persons whose preference for one oft the two positions is so strong that they rule out serving in the other position without even trying it, these persons have at some time perceived promise and opportunity in both. How do these persons compare the two sets of roles, Author'sNote:lg gratefully acknowledge graduate research assistants. Adam) Ross, Sara Yanosy, and Matt Bosse for their help with this study. Correspondence should be addressed tol David N.. Ammons, CB# 33301 Knapp- Sanders Building, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3330; e-mail:  jobs note similarities and important differences.  inac council-manager government.  responsibilities, and expectations?  ammons@soguncedu. 24    Ammons ICM and CA Similarities and Differences 25  Background: Reform Movement  A century ago, Progressive Era reformers sought to rid American cities of rampant waste and corruption in municipal affairs. They promoted merit civil service to remove the influ- ence of politics from hiring decisions and encouraged purchasing reform to reduce its impact on contract awards. Most cities eventually adopted these reforms. The reformers also pressed for fundamental changes in the way city councils were elected and city governments were structured and managed. They took particular aim at two features of the electoral system thought to be most crucial for sustaining the political machines of the early 20th century: the focus on party affiliations of candidates for municipal office and the election of city coun- cilors by ward. They urged the removal of partisan labels from municipal ballots and the elec- tion of council members on an at-large basis. Reformers argued that city council members should be elected not as partisan politicians representing a single ward or district but instead as nonpartisan, civic-minded citizens focusing on the needs of the entire community. The reformers also recommended a basic structural change in the organization of city government. They proposed that the mayor and city council retain ultimate responsibility for the city government but appoint a city manager to serve them as chief executive. The city manager would be a skilled, professional manager, selected on the basis of education and experience, and would serve at the pleasure of the city council. The administrative appara- tus of the city in this council-manager form of government would be under the direction of the appointed, professional manager rather than an elected mayor. By 1915, the National Municipal League, forerunner to today's National Civic League, was recommending the council-manager form in its Model City Charter and many cities were adopting it as their The reformers' electoral and structural proposals were embraced in some communities, adopted partially and only gradually in others, and fiercely resisted in still other cities. Changes, however, continued across the 20th century. Over time, some ofthe early adopters oft the electoral and structural prescriptions rescinded or modified various of these reform elements, whereas many of the resisters relented and adopted selected elements of reform. The history of reform adoption, partial adoption, and modification has produced a broad The percentage of U.S. cities that operate on a council-manager platform with an appointed city manager serving as chief executive (53% among cities having aj population of 5,000 or greater, according to survey responses) exceeds the percentage operating on a mayor-council base with the mayor serving as chief executive (39%; International City/County Management Association, 2006, p. xii).! Observers have noted in recent decades al blurring of the sharp distinctions that once differentiated reformed" from "unre- formed" cities (Adrian, 1988; Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004). Some council-manager cities have adopted partisan ballots, many have adopted district election of councilors or systems that include a mixture of district and at-large characteristics, and many have switched to popular election of the mayor and have granted expanded authority to that office.2 Various departures from the prescriptions of the original council-manager plan, labeled "the reform oft the reform" (Hansell, 1998, 1999), have left relatively few cities with what might be called the "pure" council-manager form. Whether inspired by the desire to  municipal structure.  mosaic of systems in evidence today.    26 The American Review of Public Administration  boost political responsiveness, to increase the representativeness of the city council, or to enhance political leadership where it was perceived to be lacking, collectively these changes have made the "more professional" form of government (i.e., council-manager government) Changes in cities operating under the mayor-council form of government, where poli- tics are prominent and the mayor serves as chief executive, have taken these cities in the opposite direction. They, too, have adopted civil service and purchasing reforms. Furthermore, many mayor-council cities have authorized their chief executive mayor or city council to appoint a CAO to bring professional expertise to the administration of municipal operations. The introduction of the CAO-carrying an array of official titles in various cities, including city administrator, chief of staff, executive assistant, and deputy mayor, as well as chief administrative officer-and the changes that the CAO often brings to city government have made the' "more political" form of government (i.e., mayor-council government) more professional (Adrian, 1988; Frederickson et al., 2004). Many proponents of mayor-council government suggest that the introduction oft the CAO or city administrator (the titles will be used interchangeably) gives this form of government the advantages of professionalism normally associated with council-manager government and the strong political leadership of mayor-council government-in short, the best of both worlds. They suggest that the hiring of CAOS is the equivalent of bringing the city manager to mayor-council government and point to the fact that many CAOs are, in fact, former city managers. Some scholars have reinforced this point, declaring, for instance, "lt turns out that CAOs in cities with mayor-council statutory platforms are much like city managers in cities with council-manager platforms" (Frederickson et al., 2004, p. 133). Or declaring, "a sizable proportion of previously mayor-counci cities have adopted city-manager-like positions" Form-of-govemment scholar James Svara is a keen observer of the roles and relationships oflocal government officials. Svara (1999) notes that "city administrators have limited per- sonnel appointment authority and are slightly less likely than city managers to have other executive powers" (p. 32) and that city administrators arej perceived by council members to be influential in policy processes but less influential than city managers (Svara, 2003). Furthermore, city administrators serving chief executive mayors occupy a secondary posi- tion in the executive chain of command, whereas city managers serve as "the head of the administrative organization-not the assistant to the head" (Svara, 2004, p. 21). Serving in asecondary capacity rather than as chief executive can still be very influential, but second- rung status on the executive ladder inevitably handicaps an administrator's ability to shape the culture and operating standards of the organization. Nevertheless, Svara (1999) notes that city administrators "have extensive executive authority" and concludes that "city managers and city administrators are more alike than we. have often presumed" (p. 32). Increasingly, scholars are comfortable lumping CAOs and city managers together in their research and describing the responsibilities of"chief appointed officials," as if their roles were: functionally equivalent (e.g., MacManus & Bullock, 2003; Svara, 1999). Some propo- nents of council-manager government disagree, insisting that the roles, and therefore the professional influence, of city managers and CAOs are far from equal.4  more political.  (Meek, Schildt, & Witt, 2002, p. 146).    Ammons /CMa and CA Similarities and Differences 27  City Administrator Role  San Francisco hired a CAO for its mayor-council government in 1931. Other major mayor-council cities, including Philadelphia, New Orleans, and New York City, soon fol- lowed suit. It isi important to note that the city administrator in this system typically reports to the mayor rather than to the council, although in many cities the council does have a role in the hiring and termination of the city administrator. Detractors suggest that this arrange- ment, particularly where the hiring is unfettered by council influence, opens an opportunity for the mayor to deviate from the original intent and appoint a political supporter rather than ap professional manager. James Hogan (1976), an early chronicler oft the CAO plan, observed, "The role of the CAO can vary all the way from errand boy to competent administrator The gap between the roles of errand boy and key administrator is wide. Placement along this divide is determined not only by the experience and skills of thej person selected as city administrator but also by the willingness of the mayor, and sometimes the city council, to trust the CAO's judgment and to vest real authority in the position. The mayor in mayor- council cities is chief executive, whether a city administrator is appointed or not. The magnitude oft the mayor's executive authority, however, varies across mayor-council cities, depending on the responsibilities declared in the city charter. When executive authority is concentrated in the office of mayor, it is said to be a strong mayor form; when executive In some mayor-council cities, the CAO either formally or informally has been granted considerable administrative authority, but even a strong city administrator typically channels budget recommendations through the mayor rather than directly to the city council and seeks the mayor's approval prior toi important hiring decisions-for, as previously noted, the mayor isc chiefe executive in thei mayor-council form. Budget ideas that fail to meet the approval oft the mayor are likely never to be seen by the council. The CAO's choices for department head appointment similarly may be preempted. In contrast, city managers in council-manager governments have the opportunity toj present unfiltered budgetary recommendations tot the city council and, in most cases, to make personnel decisions.5. Although city managers and city administrators both exercise important roles in similar arrays of functions, the fact that the mayor ini mayor-council governments is chief executive is likely to curb any actual budgetary andj personnel management authority that might be granted formally to the city administrator, rendering this official weaker than the city manager in these and other key executive functions. Still, the notion that the CAO: is, or can be, the functional equivalent oft the city manager is strongly held in some quarters. Ini fact, thel Los Angeles CAO once was named by ai national publication as the nation's all-pro' "city manager" (Oakley, 1987). Int their recents study ofi forms oflocal government, Frederickson et al. (2004) document the tendency ofn mayor-council and council-manager governments each to adopt characteristics of the other. Focusing on mayor-council governments, they declare, "When a CAO is appointed exclusively by the mayor, we regard that city as an adapted political jurisdiction. Most of these CAOs function very much like city managers" (p. 163). But even ifthey are engaged in the same functions, can we be certain that the twoj positions are functionally equivalent?1 If we detect key differ- ences ini influence and discretion in some of the mosti important of these functions, would this  performing functions similar to those of city manager" (p. 81).  authority is diffused, it is said to be a weak mayor form.  limit our ability to assert functional equivalency?    28 The American Review of Public Administration  Survey of Persons Experienced as Both City Manager and City Administrator  Scholars, practitioners, and local government observers have offered their views on the roles of city managers and CAOs; the relative strengths, weaknesses, and similarities of the two positions; and their relative contributions to the professionalization of local government. Some of these assessments are conceptual, offering perspectives based on system design, for- mal grants of authority, and notions of how a given system should work ideally. Others draw on the experience and perceptions of local government officials in one form of government or another. Still others contrast the experiences or observations of those familiar with one system to those familiar with the other. A perspective largely missing from this discussion is Perhaps no one has greater insights into the similarities and differences int the roles and responsibilities of city managers and city administrators than persons who have served in both capacities. A review ofi information available in Municipal Year Books and membership directories of the International City/County Management Association in 2004 produced the names of4 448 individuals who had held both positions at some time during their careers in local government. The cities served by these persons ranged inj population from less than 1,000 to more than 850,000 people. Contact information could be secured for all but 10of these persons, yielding a set of 438 potential respondents to a survey on the differences between the roles and responsibilities of city manager and city administrator. The survey was conducted in 2004-the first wave by e-mail and the second wave by standard mail-and Respondents drew upon their experience as city manager and city administrator to outline the characteristics and demands of each role. They shared their views about similarities and differences in the two roles and also in the respective forms of government in which these positions are found. This study probes dimensions of professionalism, staff stability, political influence, administrative responsibility and discretion, human resource management and budgetary influence, role complexity, and status. In some cases, there was broad agreement among respondents on similarities or differences; in other cases, broad disagreement.  that held by persons who have experienced both systems.  netted 276 usable responses, for an effective response rate of 63%.  Findings  Each survey respondent had held both positions during his or her career: city manager in council-manager government and city administrator in mayor-counci government. On the surface, at least, these respondents corroborated some of the contentions regarding role sim- ilarity. The respondents agreed that both are demanding positions. Although some reported that their typical workweek when they served as city manager was 40 hours, others reported ar normal workweek as lengthy as 80 hours. The reported range of normal workweeks during their service as city administrator ran from a low of 40 to a high of 75 hours. The respective means for all respondents were 53.7 hours of work in the city manager's typical week and 52.6 in the city administrator's. Both positions are important and demanding. Ifthev workl hours ofcity managers and city administrators differ little, what about the manner in which occupants of the two positions divide their time among management, policy, and    Ammons /CM: and CA Similarities and] Differences 29  Table 1  Mean Percentage ofTime Devoted to the Management, Policy, and Political Roles by Persons Serving as City Manager (CM) and City Administrator (CA)  %0 ofTime Devoted to Specified Roles  Persons Who Have Served in Both Roles  Ammons and Newell Study'  CM 1985 50.8 32.2 17.0 142  CA 1985 55.3 27.0 17.6 100  CM 2004 53.2b 29.0b 17.9 275  CA 2004 53.8 26.9 19.0 275  Management role Policy role Political role n Population of cities a. Ammons and Newell (1989,p.62).  50,000 and greater  850,000 and fewer  b.Although the mean percentages for city managers and city administrators appear remarkably similar across a period oft two decades, two differences ares statistically significant. t tests reveal statistically significant differences in the percentage of time reportedly devoted by city managers to the management role across the two studies, 1274)=2.57,p=, .01, and tot thej policy role, 127)--462.p<.001. Among city administrator time allocations, the only difference that could be considered significant ist the time reportedly devoted tot the political role across the two studies, t(274)= 1.98, p= .049, but only ifone accepts ar much more generous significance threshold. political roles? To what extent are some roles emphasized in one position and deemphasized in the other? The respondents in the current study were more numerous and represented cities having a wider population range than those in a 1985 study of time allocations (Ammons & Newell, 1989), but the reported time allotted to the management role, defined as administra- tive activities; to the policy role, including council relations; and to the political role, includ- ing community leadership, were strikingly similar across positions over two decades of time--even if, for aj pair of dimensions among city managers, these small differences in time  allocation achieve statistical significance (Table 1).  Role Equivalency"?  If persons who have served in both positions report that the posts of city manager and city administrator demand similar hours and that incumbents allocate similar amounts of their time to various roles, does this add up to role equivalency? Not necessarily, according to the Respondents were asked to declare their agreement or disagreement with a series of state- ments, some asserting that particular characteristics were more associated with one position or form of government and others declaring that the positions and forms of government are comparable on a given characteristic. The responses, shown in Table 2, are reported for the set of respondents as a whole and by subsets according to the current or most recent position (city manager or city administrator) held by the respondent.s Respondents also were asked about the relative influence and authority associated with the respective positions. In each instance, they were allowed to indicate neutrality on a given statement or question.  respondents.    30 The American Review of Public Administration  Table2  Agreement and Disagreement With Statements Regarding City Managers (CM) and City Administrators (CA)  Percentage of Respondents Who  Respondent  Strongly  Strongly 4.7 4.2 5.6 0 0 0 12.0 11.2 13.3 17.5 14.3 22.4 2.5 2.4 2.8 5.1 4.8 5.6 4.0 1.8 7.6 5.9 6.6 4.7 10.2 10.1 10.4  Statement  Category n Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Current CA 107 27.1 38.3 12.1 16.8 Current CM 169 71.6 28.4 0 Current CA 107 80.4 19.6 0 Current CM 169 5.9 24.3 15.4 43.2 Current CA 105 8.6 23.8 17.1 37.1 Current CM 168 6.0 14.3 20.8 44.6 Current CA 107 2.8 15.0 10.3 49.5 Current CM 168 24.4 55.4 3.0 14.9 Current CA 107 29.9 50.5 2.8 14.0  1.Mayor-<ouncil govemments Total than council-manager governments (X2=1.772, p=.7776) 2.Both CAs and CMs must Total bep politically astute 3.L Longevity of CAs tends Total to be more dependent on political skills and connections thant that of CMs (X2-1.604, p=. .8081) 4. CMs tend to focus on city Total council concerns and relations more than CAs do (X2=8.563,p= .073) 5.CAs and CMs devote similar amounts of attention to city council concerns andi relations <X=1 1.124, P=. .8905) 6. Staffs tend tot be equally Total manager and mayor- council governments <X=8.985,1 P=. .0615) 7.N Municipal staff tends to be more professional in council-manager governments (X2= 14.166',p=.0068) 8. Staffs tend to be equally and mayor-<:ouncil governments (X2= 5.008,p=.2865) 9.N Municipal staff tends to Total council governments <X=5.063, P=. .2809) *Statistically significant at p:5.01.  275 24.0 42.5 11.6 17.1  tend tol be more politicized Current CM 168 22.0 45.2 11.3 17.3  276 75.0 25.0 0  0 0 0  274 6.9 24.1 16.1 40.9  275 4.7 14.5 16.7 46.5 275 26.5 53.5 2.9 14.5  Total  274 7.7 37.6 12.4 37.2  professional in council- Current CM 167 4.2 36.5 13.8 40.7  Current CA 107 13.1 39.3 10.3 31.8 Current CM 167 18.6 43.7 15.6 20.4 Current CA 105 10.5 33.3 15.2 33.3  Total  272 15.4 39.7 15.4 25.4  Total  273 5.5 43.6 10.3 34.8  stable in council-manager Current CM 167 4.2 40.1 10.2 38.9  Current CA 106 7.5 49.1 10.4 28.3  274 0.7  5.1 17.2 66.8 5.4 14.9 69.6 4.7 20.8 62.3  be more: stable in mayor- Current CM 168 0.0  Current CA 106 1.9    Ammons ICMa and CA Similarities and Differences 31  Role equivalence would be corroborated convincingly if clear majorities of respondents consistently agreed with statements asserting role similarities, consistently rejected statements asserting role differences, and consistently offered neutral responses to questions asking which of the two positions has greater influence or responsibility. This level of corroboration was achieved occasionally on questions pertaining to general qualities, such as political astuteness and focus of attention, but only rarely on matters of influence and responsibility. More com- mon were either clear majorities associating a given characteristic with one position or form of government or the other or split verdicts among the respondentssubstantial numbers associ- ating one of the two positions or forms of government with a given quality, substantial numbers naming the other position or form on the same question, and still others unable to Iti ist tempting to regard a split decision--one that for a given question draws large numbers ofr responses for the city manager and roughly similar numbers for the CAO-as corrobora- tion of role equivalence; of course, it is not. In such instances only a minority of respondents has declared that there is no difference in roles. The majority in such cases has rejected role equivalence, even if the respondents could not agree among themselves about which of the two positions is more associated with a given quality. Split decisions are testimony to wide variation within each form of government on the particular qualities highlighted by a given question. On some questions and qualities, however, there was a clearer verdict, suggesting A few respondents did indeed offer opinions asserting role equivalence and declaring that they perceived few meaningful differences in forms of government. Comments supporting Differences in positions are negligible. The differing needs of differing cities served are what make the differences. Trying to find real differences between managers and administrators is like Success ine either form has more to do with fit and management style than the form of government. Seldom, however, were such opinions expressed SO overtly. More often, respondents who thought form-ol-govemment differences are overstated said that mayor-council and council- manager labels only hint at likely differences. A label, they argued, does not guarantee these differences. The authority implied by a given label may yield to contravening forces in the form of ordinances, traditions, and the personalities, predilections, education, and job experi- ence oft the mayor and members of city council or the perceived skills and integrity of the per-  draw distinctions.  less variation on that quality within a given form of government.  this view included the following:  splitting hairs.  son serving as manager or administrator. Wrote one respondent,  Experience and answers [to questions about role characteristics) depend on [the] people for whom [one is] working. Different election results in either type of community would have Even among the group of respondents who argued that the significance of labels is over- stated, some offered comments implying that they held the precepts of council-manager government in higher regard. These respondents noted that the city administrator can be  changed my answers for my experience.    32 The American Review of Public Administration  elevated by ordinance ort tradition toar role equivalent to city manager or ac city manager can The key, in my mind, is the ability of the governing body to let you manage. What If found as acity administrator ist thati ifIacted more as acity manager the governing body was happy tol have me act that way.. In [my] current city manager position, the governing body [is accustomed) tot thinkling] policy and [is]r not [inclined] tor micro-manage. You can get al lot done when you don't A respondent who cautioned against assuming too much from a job title or form-of- govemment label recommended instead a careful review of charter provisions and relevant ordinances to learn the actual roles and responsibilities ofa a position. He noted that a char- ter provision requiring council ratification of decisions tol hire or fire department heads has Thet time spent on political concerns isg greater in mayor-council cities because oft time dealing with ar mayor who wants tob bet the CEO[ [chiefe executive officer] but does not havet thel knowledge, skills, or ability tol bec one. Ibelieve that weak city administrators or CAOsi in mayor-council cities become glorified clerks in a caretaker role and therefore are not change agents that can act strategically. The city council has ultimate authority in council-manager government, but the city manager is appointed as chief executive. Action taken by the mayor or a member of the coun- cilt that would usurp the manager's executive authority is considered encroachment and is likely to be resisted, perhaps even by fellow council members. In mayor-counci governments, the role of city administrator is defined not as chief executive-the mayor holds that title-but as head of administration. The involvement of the mayor (and, in weak mayor systems, perhaps even the members of the city council) in administrative functions is less likely to be regarded as encroachment, thereby weakening the hand of the professional administrator for coordina- tion and control. Only if the elected ofticials-typically the mayor but in some cases the city council-trust the city administrator to manage city operations and function as an executive, can the city enjoy the benefits of professionalism touted by advocates of the mayor-council- Bottom line is that the difference between the two forms varies dramatically with the trust level of the current city council. If the trust level is high, both forms operate almost the same. If the trust level is low, the city administrator form has greater potential for bad government. Asa a whole, the respondents perceived differences in the work environments and authority of city managers and city administrators. For instance, they declared mayor-council government to be more political than council-manager government by a 2-to-1 margin (66% agreed or strongly agreed, whereas the other one third of respondents disagreed, strongly disagreed, or were neutral; see Statement 1 in Table 2). This does not imply, however, that council-manager governments are devoid of politics. All respondents-100%6 of them- agreed that both roles demand political astuteness. Nor does it mean that the worst images of political influence in mayor-council cities are confirmed. Most respondents rejected the stereotype oft the mayor's appointed CAO as a crony or political operative. A statement suggesting that thel longevity of city administrators is particularly dependent on political skills  be reduced similarly to the role of city administrator.  havet to watch your back.  the effect ofturning a city manager into a city administrator.  goyerment-with-CAOcombination.    Ammons /CM and CA Similarities andl Differences 33  and connections met disagreement more often than agreement. The respondents perceived clear differences in the two forms of government on the political continuum, but the forms Inr mayor-council governments of the strong mayor variety, the separation of powers between the executive (mayor) and legislative (council) branches is apt to be sharp. In the absence of a superv/isor-subordimnate relationship between the city council and mayor- appointed city administrator in that form of government, one: might assume that the bulk of the city administrator's attention would be directed toward the initiatives and concerns of the mayor and municipal staff and that less attention would be directed toward the city council. This relationship would be different in mayor-counci governments where the city council shares executive authority and has ai role in the appointment of the city administrator. And certainly, the relationship would differ from that ofa city manager, who is appointed by and accountable to the city council in a system without separation of powers. The respondents, however, challenged the assumption that city administrators might be less focused on the city council than city managers. Although precise testing of anticipated dis- tinctions was not possible in the absence of details about the structures of mayor-council cities in the backgrounds of the respondents, iti is reasonable to assume a mixture ofs strong mayor and weak mayor structures among the set, with portions of the respondents having experience in each system. Nevertheless, four of every five respondents contended that city administrators and city managers devote similar amounts of attention to city council concerns Analyzing perceived differences in professionalism and staff stability by coupling pairs of questions together reveals that a majority of respondents tended either to regard these characteristics as equivalent across forms of government or to give a decided edge to council- manager governments. On the matter of professionalism, 45% agreed with the statement that staffs tend tol be equally professional across forms of government (Statement 6i in Table 2), whereas 55% gave the edge to council-manager governments (Statement 7). Persons who had served as city administrator earlier in their career but now were: serving as city manager were especially likely to regard council-manager staffs as more professional (X2= 14.166, p<.01). City administrators were more evenly divided on the matter. A plausible explana- tion for this finding can be built on an assumption that greater variation exists in the degree of professionalism among mayor-council governments. City administrators finding them- selves in governments at the more professionalized end of the mayor-council government spectrum are pleased and stay, but many recall favorably their experience in professionalized council-manager governments as well. City administrators landing in governments at the less professionalized end of the spectrum are: not pleased and depart for a council-manager government, where they report finding al higher level of professionalism. Parsing responses to the questions regarding staff stability (Statements 8 and 9) reveals almost half perceiving equal stability across the two forms of government and only 6% reporting a stability advantage for mayor-council governments. That leaves an apparent 45% who perceive greater staff stability in council-manager governments. The opportunity to assemble and retain a staff on the basis of professional skills and experience, unencumbered by political pressures in the appointment process, and then to direct that staff is prized by professional managers. If they are to be held accountable for the performance of the organization, they argue, they should be allowed to hire the most  were not placed at polar extremes.  and relations.    34 The American Review of Public Administration  Table3 3  Percentage ofRespondents. Associating Selected Characteristics With the Position of City Manager (CM) or City Administrator (CA)  Respondent Category Total Current CM Current CA Total Current CM Current CA Total Current CM Current CA  Neither/About Equal/Difficult tos Say 15.6 11.8 21.7 52.4 44.0 65.4 23.7 14.9 37.7  n 275 169 106 275 168 107 274 168 106  CM 81.1 84.6 75.5 46.5 54.8 33.6 74.8 84.5 59.4  CA 3.3 3.6 2.8 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.5 0.6 2.8  Whot tends tol have more authority to assemble and direct his orl her management team? CX=4.828,P= .0894) Who tends tol have more influence on budgetary matters?(x2= 12.004*, p=.0025). Which position tends to carry the greater level of responsibility? (X2= 22.003**,p= .000017)  *Statistically significant atps .01. **Statistically significant atps .001,  competent staff they can and given the authority to direct its efforts. Overwhelmingly, the respondents agreed that city managers have this authority to a greater degree than city Proponents of the council-manager form assert that important differences may be found in the authority of the city manager and CAOi ini matters of human resource management, as well as differences in the influence of politics on hiring decisions. Some respondents reported My experience in al large mayor-council city was that the staff was much more likely to be friends and supporters oft ther mayor. This also was my experience all through the organization because thoset that hired the lower levels staffa also tended tol hire their friends and acquaintances As a city manager, staff hirings were based on [who was] best qualified and met education and experience requirements. Way too many times as a city administrator the mayor and council would waive important requirements of education and experience for senior positions in order to hire a' "good old boy." As a result the citizens pay the price and get a quarter on the dollar. The biggest difference is that the city manager has control of department heads and staff and therefore more control oft the direction oft the town and the quality ofs staff work. The respondents as a whole asserted that city managers have equal or greater budgetary influence than city administrators and possess a greater level of overall responsibility. Halfo of the respondents, unable to attribute greater budgetary influence to one position or the other,  administrators (Table 3).  experiences corroborating these assertions.  even when a civil service system was inj place.    Ammons ICM and CA Similarities andl Differences 35  Table. 35  Which Position Is Considered More Complex? More Political?  %R Responding City (CA) 30.5 29.8 31.8 44.2 44.3 43.9  Respondent Category Total Current CM Total Current CM  City Manager Administrator n (CM) 275 21.8 168 23.8 107 18.7 274 15.7 167 16.8 107 14.0  Neither/About Equal/Difficult toSay 47.6 46.4 49.5 40.1 38.9 42.1  Which rolei is more complex/difficult? (X2-1.004.p=. 6054) Current CA Which role tends tob be more political? -0476,p-.7884) Current CA  presumably would argue that budgetary influence isi roughly equal. However, among the other half of the respondents-those who could attribute greater influence to one position or the other-almost all associated greater budgetary influence with city managers. Little support at all was found for the notion that city administrators have greater budgetary influence. These perceptions were expressed more distinctly than might have been anticipated in light of recent research showing city managers to assess their influence in budgetary matters only moderately greater than city administrators assess theirs (92 VS. 87 on a 100-point scale; Svara, 1999). This set of respondents, consisting of persons who had served in both roles, On the question of overall responsibility, respondents were also in broad agreement. More than four fifths of the respondents currently serving as city manager, and more than half of those serving as city administrator associated greater overall responsibility with the role of Thej privilege of presenting the proposed budget directly to the city council is important to city managers for symbolic, professional, and practical reasons. As chief executive in council- manager government, itisa appropriate that the city manager present unfiltered, professional recommendations to the municipality's board of directors. Furthermore, because it isak key policy document, the budget represents one of the city manager's principal vehicles for offering policy recommendations. Managers are understandably protective oft this preroga- tive.. Assertions regarding greater overall responsibility ofc city managers were particularly pronounced among respondents currently serving as city managers (X2-22.003, p<.001). Especially noteworthy, however, is the fact that even those respondents currently serving as city administrators were more likely to concede equal or greater budgetary influence and greater overall responsibility to city managers than to claim them for CAOs. Greater budgetary and personnel authority does not necessarily mean that the city man- ager's role is more complex than that of the CAO. One respondent declared bluntly, "The role of city administrator is much broader than that of city manager, and much more complex." This view was shared by almost one third of the respondents, perhaps in recognition of the more political environment that the city administrator must navigate (Table 4). Still, almost half could not distinguish one position from the other in terms of complexity.  drew sharper distinctions.  city manager.    36 The American Review ofl Public Administration  Which rolei is more political? Nearly three times as many respondents said city admin- istrator was the more political position than made such an assertion about the city manager, but 40% were unable to designate one position as more political than the other. Several respondents noted issues of authority that can distinguish the two forms of government from each other and that caused them to favor ther role ofo city manager in council- Administrators do not have much authority. Their decisions are frequently changed by the polit- ical process and politicians. Administrators are often little more than puppets of elected officials and more often than not have nos skills in government, administration, supervision, or leadership. Under the council-manager. system the lines of responsibility and accountability are usually more clearly outlined. Under the city administrator formt the management responsibility can bei nebulous and lead to conflict over "who's the boss." This can create a lot of stress among council members As city administrator I have often been hamstrung by the mayor's ego and desire to take care of department heads who tell her what she wants to hear. Iti is therefore extremely difficult to man- age those department heads who still look to the mayor as their ultimate authority. The council has, as ar result, recently changed the charter to provide the administrator with more authority. As acity manager ina a city that had al long history of city managers, the department heads were much City managers seem to experience much less office politics. Employees must deal with the manager instead of [holdingl the implied threat oft the "end run" to ther mayor or council. As city administrator, [I was] appointed by the mayor and approved by the council. [In that system] the department heads would play off of the administrator and mayor-that is, [they would] go to whichever they thought would approve of their request. The city administrator had continuous conflicts with the mayor over what constituted day-to-day operations, which were normally the responsibility of the city administrator. On the other hand, the city admin- istrator had the political cover of ther mayor's office, whichi ist not available tot the city manager. The remarks of respondents suggest that many perceive differences in appointment, bud- getary, and general management authority between city managers and city administrators in general and wide variation among city administrators. Some CAOs are, granted considerable authority, and some are not. The comments of respondents suggest that as CAOs, they are pleased when they are granted the authority normally associated with city managers. As city  manager government:  and staff.  easier to manage. They [understood] they were part ofr my team.  managers, they expect such authority. Career Progression  Respondents held differing views regarding the status and desirability of the city manager position relative to the position of city administrator. These differences were particularly evident when respondents were asked about career progression and, more specifically, about what constitutes a lateral move or a step up professionally.. A careful review of their answers suggests that the group as a whole tended to accord equal or greater status and desirability to    Ammons /CM and CA Similarities and Differences 37  Table: 5  Municipal Officials' Assessment of Career Progressions  %ofl Respondents Who  Respondent  Strongly  Strongly 2.9 3.0 2.8 6.2 3.0 11.2  Statement  Category n Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Current CM 168 5.4 29.8 18.5 43.5  A move from a CA position toa Total CM position in a city of similar size and characteristics Current CA isal lateralr move professionally CX=9.260, P=. 0549) A move from a CA position toa Total CM position ina a slightly smaller city having similar characteristics isas stepz up professionally (X2= 19.005**, p= .0008) Note: CA = city administrator; CM = city manager. **Statistically significant atp .001.  274 5.8 35.4 19.0 36.9 106 6.6 44.3 19.8 26.4 276 4.7 37.7 22.8 28.6  Current CM 169 5.3 46.2 19.5 26.0 Current CA 107 3.7 24.3 28.0 32.7  the position of city manager (Table 5). When asked if a move from the city administrator position in one city to the city manager position in another city ofs similar size and character- istics would be considered a lateral move, respondents were divided. Approximately 41% thought that it would indeed be a lateral move, 40% disagreed, and 19% could not say. Why did sO many disagree? Did they perceive such a move to be a step up rather than merely a lateral move? Responses to a related question suggest that the answer is yes. Status among managers and administrators is drawn inj part from the size of the commu- nity one serves. This factor was removed from the equation by the previous question that posed ai move to a community of similar size. Thej population factor, however, was used in the next question to test the extent to which the role of city manager might actually be favored, for in this question the destination city is smaller. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "A move from a city administrator position toa city manager position in a slightly smaller city having similar characteristics is a step up professionally."I More than 42% agreed or strongly agreed, even though the move would be toa smaller city. The level of agreement was particularly evident among current city man- agers (51.5%), each of whom had also served as city administrator in the past (X2= 19.005,  p<.001). Wrote one respondent,  Iwent from ai much larger community as a city administrator to a smaller one with al long tradition of professional council-manager government. After 17 years, I have no regrets!  Another was even more adamant:  Iwould never work as a city administrator again.    38 The American Review of] Public Administration  Conclusion  Scholars and urban observers have declared that distinctions between the mayor-council and council-manager forms of government are becoming blurred and that the two forms are moving closer together in many respects (Adrian, 1988; Frederickson et al., 2004). They, of course, are correct. However, occasional assertions that CAOs in mayor-council cities have brought to their municipalities the same level of professionalism that city managers have brought to theirs are overstated. Too often these assertions disregard impor- tant differences in serving in the role of chief executive (city manager) versus the role of principal assistant (CAO), as well as differences in the political-professional environments that persist despite general movement toward the blurring of the forms of government. Differences inj politicization and professionalism in council-manager and mayor-council governments, manifested in differing budgetary and personnel influence and in the respon- sibility vested in appointed professionals in the respective forms of government, are reported by professionals who have held top appointive posts in both. Despite the blurring The perspectives of persons surveyed in this study contribute to a broader understanding of role similarities and differences. Having served as both city manager and city administra- tor at different points in their careers, their observations are firsthand. Still, it is important to recognize the limitations, as well as the strengths, of this set of respondents as experts on the question of role equivalency. The principal limitation is that the perspective of each respon- dent is limited by the particular conditions he or she has experienced. The perceptions reflected in their responses have been influenced by the individual communities the respon- dents have served, the personalities and practices of the mayors and councils with whom they have worked, and the prescriptions and restrictions of state laws and city charters affecting local government structures in the communities along their particular career paths. Their views regarding the level of responsibility and influence they held as city manager and city administrator are likely to be affected by the sequence, career stage, and length of tenure in the positions they held, as well as by relationships and occurrences they observed or experi- enced and now consider to be characteristic ofa given form of government. Nevertheless, the set of respondents in this study is a large group of persons that is not restricted to one state or region, one career sequence (i.e., a manager-to-CAO progression or vice versa), or service with mayors and council members of one personality type. Included in the set of respondents ial broad range of experiences, providing ample opportunity for favorable and unfavorable recollections coast to coast, community type to community type, and mayoral personality to The research design for this study perhaps is biased somewhat to the advantage of city administrators, making the results inf favor of city managers all the more striking. Ift the lit- erature: suggesting that CAOs range from competent administrator to errand boys is correct, this set of respondents, consisting solely of persons who also have served as city managers, undoubtedly underrepresents the errand boy element. Iti is unlikely that persons whose pro- fessional credentials qualify them for city manager positions would accept or even be offered an errand boy role.7Ifthis assumption is correct, this study could understate the dif- ference between city manager and city administrator roles in general by underrepresenting that portion ofCAO positions with minimal influence and managerial responsibility.  of distinctions in the broadest sense, these key differences remain.  mayoral personality.    Ammons /CM: and CA Similarities and] Differences 39  Despite these limitations, this set of respondents lends tot the question of city manager-CAO role equivalence thej perspective ofp practitioners who have experienced both roles. Theirs is not the detached perspective of arm's-length observers. Nor is theirs the perspective of a practi- tioner who has served in only one of the two positions and is convinced of the superiority of that position and its form of government. Theirs ist the perspective of persons who have labored Asa group, persons who have served in both roles acknowledge the functional similari- ties of the positions of city manager and city administrator. But on several key dimensions- particularly on matters of budget and human resource management-they reject the assertion of role equivalence. On these important dimensions, the city manager's influence and authority are perceived to be greater. These findings suggest that local government observers and modern architects of municipal organizations overreach when they imply that CAOs and city managers are alike in their influence on the professionalization ofa a city's government. Professionalism tends to be advanced by the appointment of a city administrator  to function effectively ine each position.  and advanced even further by the appointment ofac city manager.  Notes  1.The figures reported are based on survey responses from 5,142 cities of 5,000 population or greater. Other forms of city government include the commission form (2%), the town meeting form (5%), and the representative town meeting form (1%). The two major forms of local government are the mayor-:ouncil and council-manager forms. In the mayor-<:ouncil form, the mayor serves as chief executive. Executive authority may be concentrated int the office of mayor ("strong mayor" form) or diffused among the mayor, city council, and elected executives ("weak mayor" form). In many cases, the mayor in mayor-<:ouncil governments (especially in the "strong mayor" variety) has the power to veto council actions. The election of council members is often by wards and partisan. As noted in this article, the introduction of the council-manager form of govemment was the reformers' attempt to professionalize local government and preserve the ultimate authority of the city council but reduce the influence 2.1 Early versions of the council-manager plan typically called for the selection of the mayor from among the persons elected to city council. Often this was accomplished by a simple vote of the new council. There were and are, however, many variations. For instance, some rotate the office of mayor among council members; some others award the office of mayor to the highest vote getter in the general election. Increasingly. however, even council-manager cities have moved toward popular election oft the mayor, as noted in this article. 3.1 Representativeness: proved to be a problem in many reformed cities, where at-large voting systems thwarted the efforts ofr minority candidates tos gain election to the city council. Candidates who could carry the election in their minority neighborhood failed to do so on a citywide basis. By switching to district elections, 4.4 Among the most ardent advocates of the council-manager form of government and the role of city man- ager is a group of International City/County Management Association members calling itself the "Staunton 5. Although city managers have the authority toj prepare the proposed budget and tol hire and fire department heads, many acknowledge that often they confer with the mayor and council prior to exercising this authority, especially before filling key staff positions or removing a major department head.. As noted by one respondent tot thes survey reported in this article, "Such approval is not required in a council-manager: form, but aj politically astute city manager will bes sure his/her appointments meet the approval oft the council in any event." 6. The "current position" variable is isolated for examination not only because the position itself could reflect the perceptions and preferences among respondents, given that they have accepted their current position after priors servicei in the other form ofgovernment orp perhaps in both forms, but also because it could have more subtle influences ont their responses. Itsi influence could be positive, for respondents might be tempted to ratio- nalize their career progression and put a positive spin on their current position and form of government, ori it  ofpolitics on administration ands service delivery.  many oft these cities achieved greater representativeness on their city councils. Society" after the Virginia city credited with hiring the first city manager in 1908.    40 The American Review ofPublic Administration  could ber negative ift thej pressures of their current position, whichever itis, cause them to recall fondly the best features of the other form of government (a' "greener grass" syndrome). Responses from persons not currently serving as either city manager or city administrator were included witht the position most recently occupied.  7.Iamg grateful to an anonymous reviewer for offering this observation.  References  Adrian, C.R. (1988). Forms of city government in American history. In Municipal Year Book 1988 (pp. 3-11). Ammons, D. N., & Newell, C. (1989). Cily executives. Albany: State University of New York Press. Frederickson, H. G., Johnson, G. A., & Wood, C.H. (2004). The adapted city: Institutional dynamics and struc- Hansell, W.1 H., Jr. (1998). Isi itt time to' "reform" the reform? Public Management, 80(12), 15-16. Hansell, W. H., Jr. (1999). Reforming the reform, part 2. Public Management, 81(1), 28. Hogan, J.B.(1976). The chiefadministrative: officer: An alternative to council-manager government. Tucson: University of Arizona, Institute of Government Research. International City/County Management Association. (2006). In. Municipal year book: 2006. Washington, DC: MacManus, S.A., & Bullock, C. S., III. (2003). Thef form, structure, and composition of America's municipalities int the new millennium. In Municipal year book 2003 (pp. 3-18). Washington, DC: International City/County Meek, J. W., Schildt, K., & Witt, M. (2002). Local government administration in a metropolitan context. InH. G. Frederickson & J.I Nalbandian (Eds.), The future ofl local government administration (pp. 145-153). Washington, DC: International City/County Management. Association. Oakley, A. (1987). A commanding view from the top. City and State, 4, 18. Svara,J J.H.( (1999). U.S. city managers and administrators in a global perspective. In Municipal yearb book 1999 (pp. 25-33). Washington, DC: International City/County Management. Association. Svara, J.H H. (2003). Two decades of continuity and change in America's city councils. Washington, DC: National Svara, J.1 H. (2004). Achieving effective community leadership. In C. Newell (Ed.), The effective local govern- ment manager (3rd ed., pp. 21-56). Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association. David N. Ammons ist the Albert Coates Professor of Public. Administration and Government att the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of Municipal Benchmarks: Assessing Local Performance and Establishing Community Standards (Sage, 2001) and Tools for Decision Making: A Practical Guide for Local Government (CQ Press, 2002). His research interests include local government management, performance  Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.  tural change. Armonk, NY:M.E. Sharpe.  Author.  Management Association.  League of Cities.  measurement, and benchmarking.